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Abstract
The European Community (“EC”) is 50 years old this year, albeit having undergone a change
of name and, just to confuse everyone, the articles of the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity (“EC Treaty”) underwent a change in numbering. If the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force,
the European Community itself will disappear, being absorbed into the European Union (“EU”),
and the present EC Treaty will become the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“FEU”). It is thus appropriate that this issue of the Fordham International Law Journal be devoted
to the Golden Anniversary of the European (Economic) Community, and yet this issue may serve
as a state of the art assessment of Community law on the possible eve of the disappearance of the
very body which is the subject of this celebration. However, the subject of this contribution, the
present Articles 28-30 EC, will be renumbered, but otherwise remain intact, to become Articles
34-36 FEU.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Community ("EC") is 50 years old this year,'
albeit having undergone a change of name and, just to confuse
everyone, the articles of the Treaty establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty") underwent a change in numbering.2
* B.A. 1975, M.A. 1979, Oxford University; M.Sc. 1976 London University (LSE);
Barrister (Middle Temple, 1978), LL.D., Utrecht University (1985); Professor of Euro-
pean Law &Jean Monnet Professor, University of Groningen (The Netherlands), Jean
Monnet Centre of Excellence; Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges (Belgium).
For the uninitiated, the first part of the title of this article refers to the words of the
song by Eben E. Rexford (1848-1916), music by H.P. Danks.
1. The European Economic Community ("EEC") was established by the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Economic Community ("EEC Treaty") (Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11). The EEC Treaty was ratified by Italy on Nov. 23, 1957, by France on Nov.
25, 1957, and by the remaining original parties (Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and
The Netherlands) on Dec. 13, 1957. Under the terms of Art. 247 EEC Treaty, it entered
into force on January 1, 1958.
2. Among the changes made under the Treaty of Amsterdam (Treaty of Amster-
dam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European
Communities and certain related acts, O.J. C 340/1 (1997)), Arts. 30-36 of the EEC
Treaty were shorn of their transitional provisions (Arts. 31-33, 34(2) & 35) and the old
Art. 30 EEC became Art. 28 EC Treaty (see Consolidated Version of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community art. 28, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 44 (2006), with the
renaming of the European Economic Community as the European Community). The
Treaty of Amsterdam also contained the following redrafting which does not affect the
meaning. Art. 30 EEC reads: "Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures
having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohib-
ited between Member States." See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, at 32 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Art. 28 EC reads
"Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be
prohibited between Member States." See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community art. 28, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 52 (2006) [hereinafter EC
Treaty]. Art. 34(1) EEC (EEC Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, at 33), became
(unchanged) Art. 29 EC: "Quantitative restrictions on exports, and all measures having
equivalent effect, shall be prohibited between Member States." See EC Treaty, supra, art.
29, O.J. C. 321 E/37, at 53. Art. 36 EEC (EEC Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, at
55), became, apart from the reference to the revised article numbers, unchanged in
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If the Treaty of Lisbon' comes into force, the European Commu-
nity itself will disappear, being absorbed into the European
Union ("EU"), and the present EC Treaty will become the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("FEU"). 4 It
is thus appropriate that this issue of the Fordham International
Law Journal be devoted to the Golden Anniversary of the Euro-
pean (Economic) Community, and yet this issue may serve as a
state of the art assessment of Community law on the possible eve
of the disappearance of the very body which is the subject of this
celebration. However, the subject of this contribution, the pre-
sent Articles 28-30 EC, will be renumbered, but otherwise re-
main intact, to become Articles 34-36 FEU.5
I. BEFORE DASSONVILLE
The first judgment6 in which the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") considered the elimination of quantitative restrictions
and measures having equivalent effect related to a breach of the
first paragraph of Article 31 of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community ("EEC Treaty"), which required
Member States to refrain from introducing between themselves
any new quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent
effect; the ECJ, however, made no attempt to define what was
meant by that concept, but pointed out that Article 30 of the EC
substance, Art. 30 EC: "The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibi-
tions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transitjustified on grounds of pub-
lic morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of
humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, his-
toric or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property.
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not however constitute a means of arbitrary dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States." See EC Treaty,
supra, art. 29, O.J. C. 321 E/37, at 53. The latest Consolidated version of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), was published in 2006 but it does
not take account of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on January 1, 2007. As for
the purposes of the analysis in this article, the renumbering is of no substantive conse-
quence. The present numbers are used throughout this contribution, although in
square brackets where a quotation in fact referred to the original numbering.
3. Draft Treaty of Lisbon (Reform Treaty), O.J. C 306/01 (2007), corrigenda O.J. C
111/56 (2008) opened for signature Dec. 13, 2007 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Reform
Treaty].
4. Reform Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2, O.J. C 306/01, at 42.
5. FEU is the appropriate abbreviation for the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (as the EC Treaty will become on the entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon).
6. Commission v. Italy, Case 7/61, [1961] E.C.R 317.
20081 SILVER THREADS AMONG THE GOLD 1639
Treaty "is directed to eventualities of a non-economic kind,
which are not liable to prejudice the principles laid down by Ar-
ticles [28]-430] of the EC Treaty, as the last sentence of the arti-
cle confirms."7 Moreover, it held that EC Treaty Article 30 did
not establish a generic protective clause additional to that pro-
vided by Article 226 EEC, and thus that Article 30 did not allow
Member States to derogate by unilateral action from the proce-
dure guarantees laid down by that provision.'
Although there were some considerable difficulties in rela-
tion to the free movement of goods, as far as the prohibition of
customs duties and charges having equivalent effect in trade be-
tween Member States was concerned,9 and not inconsiderable
developments in relation to the prohibition of discriminatory
taxation on imports and exports, 10 it was some years before the
next major development occurred: in April 1968, the ECJ ruled
in Fink-Frucht GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Miinchen-Landbergerstrade11
that internal taxation which did not infringe the prohibition of
7. See id. at 329.
8. Art. 226 EEC Treaty (EEC Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, at 144) was
repealed in the tidying up by the Treaty of Amsterdam; it was otiose, referring to a
procedure whereby the Commission could authorize the Member State to take protec-
five measures to rectify difficulties during the transitional period. That period came to
an end at midnight on December 31, 1969.
9. See, e.g., Commission v. Luxembourg & Belgium, Joined Cases 2 & 3/62, [1962]
E.C.R. 445 (gingerbread); NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van
Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case 26/62, [1963]
E.C.R. 1; Commission v. Luxembourg & Belgium, Joined Cases 90 & 91/63, [1964]
E.C.R. 625 (milk products); Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. S.A. Ch.
Brachfeld & Sons, Joined Cases 2 & 3/69, [1969] E.C.R. 211; Eunomia di Porro E. C. v.
Ministry of Education of Italy, Case 18/71, [1971] E.C.R. 811; S.p.A. Marimex v. Minis-
try of Finance of Italy, Case 84/71, [1972] E.C.R. 89; S.p.A. Marimex v. Italian Finance
Administration, Case 29/72, [1972) E.C.R. 1309; Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Risi, Case 2/
73, [1973] E.C.R. 865; Fratelli Variola S.p.A. v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze,
Case 34/73, [1973] E.C.R. 981; Rewe-Zentralfinanz eGmbH v. Direktor der Landwirt-
schaftskammer Westfalen-Lippe, Case 39/73, [1973] E.C.R. 1039.
10. See, e.g., Commission v. Italy, Case 45/64, [1965] E.C.R. 857; Alfons Lfitticke
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis, Case 57/65, [1966] E.C.R. 205; Firma Molkerei-Zen-
trale Westfalen/Lippe GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Paderborn, Case 28/67, [1968] E.C.R.
143; Firma Kurt A. Becher v. Hauptzollamt Mfinchen-Landbergerstrale, Case 13/67,
[1968] E.C.R. 187; Firma August Stier v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Ericus, Case 31/67,
[1968] E.C.R. 235; Firma Gebrader Ltlck v. Hauptzollamt K61n-Rheinau, Case 34/67,
[1968] E.C.R. 245; Commission v. Italy, Case 16/69, [1969] E.C.R. 377; Commission v.
Italy, Case 28/69, [1970] E.C.R. 187; Commission v. Belgium, Case 77/69, [1970]
E.C.R. 237.
11. See Fink-Frucht GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Mt~nchen-Landbergerstrade, Case 27/
67, [1968] E.C.R. 223, 233.
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discriminatory taxation on imports and exports could not come
within the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and measures
having equivalent effect, within the meaning of Article 28 of the
EC Treaty, as those restrictions, which were intended to limit the
quantities imported, in fact differed both in their purpose and
the way in which they operate from measures of a fiscal nature.
Moreover, the two sets of provisions laid down different periods
of time and different procedures for the elimination of the re-
strictions to which they referred, and it would thus be difficult to
concede that one on the same tax could be both a measure hav-
ing equivalent to a quantitative restriction and internal taxa-
tion. 12 Further demarcation occurred in Commission v. Italy, the
first "Art Treasures" case,'" in which the ECJ found that the pro-
visions of Article 30 EC could not be invoked to justify measures
which constitute customs duties or charges having equivalent ef-
fect; the ECJ also observed that exceptions to the fundamental
rule that all obstacles to the free movement of goods between
Member States had to be eliminated, must be strictly construed.
In any event, it continued, the fact that the provisions of Article
30 EC do not relate to customs duties and charges having
equivalent effect was explained by the fact that such measures
had the sole effect of rendering more onerous the exportation
of art treasures, without ensuring the attainment of the relevant
objective referred to in Article 30 EC (namely to protect artistic,
historic, or archaeological heritage). In order to be able to avail
themselves of that provision, the Member States had to observe
the limitations which it imposed, both as regards the objective to
be attained and, as regards the nature of the means used to at-
tain it.1 4 As the seeds of the necessity and proportionality tests of
justifications for measures having equivalent effect, sowed (in
the ECJ's subsequent view) 15 in the second sentence of Article 30
12. See id. at 231.
13. Commission v. Italy, Case 7/68, [1968] E.C.R. 423.
14. See id. at 430-31.
15. See, e.g., Regina v. Henn & Darby, Case 34/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3795, 3815. It is
submitted that even though it is clear that the second sentence of Art. 30 EC is designed
to avoid abuse of the grounds ofjustification in the first sentence, the better view is that
the necessity and proportionality of a measure are to be examined in the context of the
alleged justification, and that a measure which is (ostensibly) justified may nevertheless
fall foul of the second sentence of Art. 30 EC. Thus the second sentence is designed to
prevent the dressing up of essentially protective measures in the sheep's clothing of
justifications, whereas necessity and proportionality go to the question of whether a
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EC began to germinate, the policy of interpreting the first sen-
tence of Article 30 EC strictly had been convincingly launched.
This led the ECJ in 1972 to reiterate that Article 30 of the EC
Treaty could not be understood as authorizing measures of a dif-
ferent nature from those referred to in Articles 28 and 29; thus,
while Article 30 EC did not prevent sanitary inspections, it did
not thereby permit the imposition of charges levied on imported
goods subjected to such inspections and intended to cover the
costs incurred; such a charge was not intrinsically necessary to
the exercise of the power laid down in Article 30 EC and was
thus capable of constituting an additional barrier to intra-Com-
munity trade. 16
The ECJ well demonstrated the ramifications of this ap-
proach in Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-
Grodmdrkte GmbH & Co. KG'7 in which it drew a distinction be-
tween the exercise of rights recognized by legislation of the
Member State with regard to industrial and commercial prop-
erty, which the EC Treaty does not affect, and the exercise of
those rights which could nevertheless fall within the prohibition
of which the EC Treaty laid down; thus, although Article 30 EC
permitted prohibitions or restrictions on free movement of
products which were justified for the purpose of protecting in-
dustrial or commercial property rights, it only admitted deroga-
tions from that freedom to the extent to which they were justi-
fied for the purpose of safeguarding rights which constituted the
specific subject-matter of such property. The ECJ held that the
prohibition of marketing in a Member State of products, distrib-
uted by the holder of the right or with his consent on the terri-
tory of another Member State on the sole ground that such dis-
tribution did not take place on the national territory, would, by
legitimizing the isolation of national markets, be repugnant to
the essential purpose of the Treaty, which was to unite national
markets into a single market; that purpose could not be attained
if, under the various legal systems of the Member States, nation-
als of those States were able to partition the market and bring
justification can be made out. See L.W. GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE
WITHIN THE EEC 210-20 (1985).
16. See SpA Marimex v. Italian Finance Administration, Case 29/72, [1972] E.C.R.
1309, 1318.
17. Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grodmfrkte GmbH &
Co. KG., Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R. 487.
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about arbitrary discrimination or disguise restrictions on trade
between Member States.18 Here too, important factors in the fu-
ture development of the case-law on the use of industrial and
commercial property rights were launched: the importance of
the unity of the market, the doctrine of exhaustion of rights, and
the importance of consent to first marketing within the Commu-
nity in that context. Later that year (1971) the ECJ held that the
prohibitions of Articles 28 and 29 EC precluded, apart from the
exceptions for which provision was made by Community law it-
self, those provisions which required, even purely as a formality,
import or export licenses or any other similar procedure.19
Penultimately, in the context of a common organization of
the market for rice, 2° the ECJ found in 1973 that "the prohibi-
tion of quantitative restrictions covers measures which amount
to a total or partial restraint of, according to the circumstances,
imports, exports or goods in transit."'2 1 It went on to find that
measures having equivalent effect not only took the form of re-
straint described; whatever the description or technique em-
ployed, they could also consist of encumbrances having the same
effect.
22
Finally, there came the notorious judgment in Van Zuylen
Frres v. Hag AG ("Hag /,),23 which for many years cast a long
shadow over Community industrial and commercial property
law. In view of the emphasis noted above in Deutsche Grammophon
on the unity of the market, and the need to ensure that private
parties did not artificially resurrect barriers to intra-Community
trade that the Member States had been obliged to abolish, the
18. See id. at 499-500.
19. See Int'l Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en FruitJoined Cases 51,
52, 53, 54/71, [1971] E.C.R. 1107, 1116.
20. Prior to the end of the transitional period (when Arts. 28-30 EC acquired di-
rect effect), the Council used to copy the prohibitions of inter alia Arts. 28 & 29 EC
Treaty into the integral text of the regulations on the common organization of the
various agricultural markets. This ensured that the prohibitions were directly applica-
ble, and had direct effect in the agricultural sphere even before they had direct effect
in other areas. This explains why, in some of the Arts. 28-30 cases involving common
organizations of the market, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") actually ruled on
the wording of the regulation, rather than on the identical wording of the EC Treaty
itself.
21. See Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Risi, Case 2/73, [1973] E.C.R. 865, 879.
22. See id.
23. See generally Van Zuylen Frires v. Hag AG, Case 192/73, [1974] E.C.R. 731
[hereinafter Hag i].
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ECJ's approach in Hag I is understandable, but the common ori-
gin doctrine used by the ECJ (the trademarks involved were orig-
inally in one pair of hands, but through results of wartime se-
questration and subsequent sale were no longer) manifestly
failed to take account of the importance of the function of a
trademark in the eyes of the consumer, as guaranteeing the au-
thenticity of a product, and the risk of confusion in the con-
sumer's mind of having two different companies marketing-by
this time-very different versions of Caf6 Hag decaffeinated cof-
fee. The burial of this doctrine came only as late as 1990 in SA
CNL-SUCAL-NV v. HAG GF AG ("Hag iF),24 it being made plain
that what was decisive was that the trademarks were identical or
confusingly similar in respect of similar products, and that there
were no legal or economic ties between the parties concerned.
Where there are indeed such links, the principle of exhaustion
still applies in respect of intra-Community trade, and an attempt
to maintain exclusivity of distribution by use of separate trade-
marks may well involve an infringement of Community anti-trust
law. Moreover, as third parties operating under licenses of
right2 5 and now, to the disappointment of consumers, others26
24. See generally SA CNL-SUCAL-NV v. HAG GF AG, Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R. I-
3711. The circumstances were dramatic: the ECJ had heard a powerful opinion (in
connection with which, it is worth recalling the analysis by Jacobs (1975). See Francis
Jacobs, Industrial Property and the EEC Treaty: A Reply, 24 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 643, 653,
from Advocate General Jacobs, advocating a reversal of the approach in SA CNL-SUCAL-
NVv. HAG GFAG [hereinafter Hag II]. Because of a series of takeovers in the beverage
sector, the ownership of the trademarks had, since the reference to the ECJ, reverted
into ownership within one group of companies, and the parties had no longer any
interest in continuing the litigation. Accordingly, they made an appointment with the
referring national court to ask for the reference to be withdrawn. Whether by coinci-
dence or by fast footwork, the ECJ pronounced its judgment shortly before the parties
were due to appear before the national court! Confirming that the common origin
principle was abandoned not merely in the case of compulsory splitting of ownership,
but also in the case of voluntary splitting, see generally IHT Internationale Heiztechnik
GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH, Case C-9/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2789.
25. See Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, Case 19/84, [1985] E.C.R. 1-2281, 2298.
26. See, e.g., Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-355/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4799; Sebago Inc. v. G-B Unic
SA, Case C-173/98, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4103; Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Imports Ltd.,
Joined Cases C-414-416/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-8691. But see Phytheron International SA v.
Jean Bourdon SA, Case C-352/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1729; Van Doren & Q GmbH v. Lifes-
tyle Sports & Sportwear Handelsdgesellschaft MbH, Case C-244/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-
3051. These judgments (involving consideration of the First Trademark Directive,
Council Directive No. 89/104, [1989] O.J. L 40/1, and in the later cases its interaction
with Arts. 28-30 EC) build on the much earlier series ofjudgments in EM]iRecords Ltd. v.
CBS United Kingdom Ltd., Case 51/75, [1975] E.C.R. 811, decided on June 15, 1976.
2008] 1643
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have found out to their cost, the doctrine of consent to first mar-
keting within the Community forms a key condition to the ex-
haustion doctrine.
Prior to the celebrated judgment in Procureur du Roi v. Das-
sonville,2 7 the scene had been set with the development of vari-
ous general principles: the non-availability of Article 30 EC to
justify barriers to intra-Community trade on economic grounds,
the strict interpretation of the first sentence of Article 30 of the
EC Treaty, the importance of the unity of the market place, even
in relation to the conduct of individuals, and the importance of
consent to first marketing within the Community in relation to
the use made of national industrial and commercial property
rights. Of these principles, it is worth recalling that the applica-
bility of Articles 28-30 EC to the conduct of individuals as such
(as opposed to an individual acting in an official capacity, whose
acts therefore are attributable to the State) 28 in relation to the
use they make of industrial and commercial property rights is an
anomaly, because in all other aspects, Articles 28-30 EC only ap-
ply to State measures. 29 This anomaly is really explicable on the
basis that it is State measures which are being invoked, albeit by
27. Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837.
28. See generally AGM-COS.MET Srl v. Suomen Valtio, Case C-470/03, [2007]
E.C.R. 1-2749.
29. See Criminal Proceedings Against Van de Haar, Cases 177 & 178/82, [1984]
E.C.R. 1797, 8-24; VZW Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. VZW Sociale Dienst
van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten, Case 311/85, [1987] E.C.R.
3801, 3830; Bayer AG et al. v. Sfillh6fer, Case 65/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5249, 5285; Sapod
Audic v. Eco-Emballages SA, Case C-159/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-5031, 5085 (the ECJ re-
ferred to para. 5 of Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837 and to
para. 36 of Colim NVv. Bigg's Continent Noord NV, Case C-33/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-3175,
3215, neither of which support the proposition advanced, "a contractual provision can-
not be regarded as a barrier to trade for purposes of Article 28 EC since it was not
imposed by a Member State but agreed between individuals." See Colim NV v. Bigg's
Continent Noord NV, Case C-33/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-3175, 74. P. Oliver and S. En-
chelmaier state that a Member State can only be liable for the acts of private parties in
highly exceptional circumstances. See P. Oliver & S. Enchelmaier, Free Movement of
Goods, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 649, 663 (2007). They rightly refer to the angry farm-
ers judgment, Commission v. France, Case C-265/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6959, and to the
environmental protest judgment, Schmidberger v. Austria, Case C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R.
1-5659, but, with respect, it is not the case that a Member State is liable for the act of
private parties, the liability is for the failure to ensure that the free movement of goods
is maintained and ensured-in other words, the failure to say anything about the acts of
private parties. As to the notification and consultation obligations imposed by Commu-
nity law in the case of disruptions to intra-Community trade, see Council Regulation
No. 2679/98, O.J. L 337/8 (1998).
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private individuals, to create barriers to the free movement of
goods which the Member States have been obliged to remove.
II. THE ACADEMIC DISPUTES
Despite the fact that in a number of later judgements the
ECJ would make the, as far as Article 28 EC is concerned, irrele-
vant observation that a particular measure was not designed to
hinder trade between Member States,"0 it has been clear from
the very beginning of the attempts to define the notion of mea-
sures having equivalent effect, that it should be viewed as an ef-
fects doctrine rather than a concept which depended upon the
nature or contents-or even purpose of the measure.3 1 Indeed,
the Commission rightly emphasized this very early on;3 2 observ-
ing later that Article 28 EC, applied not merely to legal and ad-
ministrative measures, but also to administrative practices.33
Somewhat curiously though, the Commission took the view that
measures, which were equally applicable to imports and national
products would not, in most cases, fall within the ambit of Article
28 EC.34 This initial approach excited a veritable flood of aca-
demic writing, which, like Ancient Gaul, can be divided into
three: those who took the view that only discriminatory measures
were caught by the notion of measures having equivalent ef-
fect,35 those who took a wider view looking at obstacles to trade
30. See, e.g., H. Krantz GmbH v. Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen, Case C-69/88,
[1990] E.C.R. 1-583,597; Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases
C-267 & 268/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, 6130.
31. The intention of a measure may be relevant in relation to Art. 30 ECjustifica-
tions, in relation to the second sentence of that provision (but, it is respectfully submit-
ted that it is not a necessary ingredient, in determining whether a measure forms a
means of arbitrary discrimination, although it will usually form a substantial element in
deciding whether the measure forms a disguised restriction on trade). See EC Treaty,
supra note 2, art. 30, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 53.
32. See generally Reply to Written Question No. 118 by M. Deringer to the EEC
Commission, 901 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPtENNES ('J.O.") 67
(1967); see also D. Ehle, MaBnahmen mit gleicher Wirkung wie Mengemmdiige
Beschrankungen und ihre Abschaffung im Gemeinsamen Markt, 125 AUBENWIRTSCHAyrs-
DIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS ("AW") 453, 455 (1967).
33. See generally Reply to Written Question No. 64 by M. Deringer to the EEC Com-
mission, 169J.O. 12 (1967).
34. See generally id.
35. See M. Seidel, Der EWG-rechtliche Begriff der Massnahmen gleicher Wirkung wie eine
mengemflige Beschrankung, (1967) 9 NEUE JURISTISCHER WOCHENSCHRFr 2081, 2084,
2086 (1967); G. Meier, 6 AWD 219, 220; see generally D. EHLE & G. MEjER, EWG-
WARENVERXEHR, (1971); M. GRAF, DER BEGRIFF MASSNAHMEN GLEICHER WIRKUNG WIE
2008] 1645
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between Member States, 36 and those who took a view broadly
supportive of the Commission. The wide divergences of views
in the literature well demonstrated the difficulty of achieving a
balance between the understandable desire of the Member
States to continue to enforce the legislation on the one hand
and integrationist demands of the Community on the other.38
The narrow interpretation of Article 28 would have allowed the
Member States to frustrate the achievement of the free move-
ment of goods envisaged in the Treaty. And yet the wider view
gave rise to fears that in important sectors the effective right of
the Member States to legislate would be eroded. Although the
use of the principle of proportionality by the Commission39 and
the observation by VerLoren van Themaat that many equally ap-
plicable obstacles would be likely to benefit from Article [30],40
represented an attempt to find a balance between the demands
of the Community and the claims of the Member States, it was
not until the judgment of the ECJ in Dassonville4 1 that the pri-
macy of Community interests was firmly established in relation
to Article 28.
MENGENMASSIGE EINFUHRBESCHRANKUNGEN IN DEM EWG-VERTRAG (1972). Broadening
the narrow approach somewhat, finding "material discrimination" (i.e., in fact if not in
law) sufficient, E. Steindorff, Dienstleistungsfteiheit und Ordre Public, in DIENSTLEISTUNC-
SFREIHEIT UND VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHT IM GEMEINSAMEN MARKT 79, 83 (Maurice
Lagrange et al. eds., 1971).
36. See P. VerLoren van Themaat, Bevat Artikel 30 van het EEG-Verdag slechts een non-
Discriminatiebeginsel ten aanzien van invoerbeperkingen? SOCIAAL ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING
("SEW ' ) 632 (1967); P. Verloren van Themaat, EEG-richtlijnen betreffende discriminerende
aankooppolitick, overheidsinstellingen, discriminerende prijsvoorschriften en andere maatregelen
van gelijke werking als kwantitative invoerbeperkingen, SEW 258 (1970) (criticizing the Com-
mission's standpoint in Commission Directive No. 70/50, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1970, at
17); M. WAELBROECK, I LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE 102-03
(J. M6gret et al. eds., 1970). See also, subsequently, A. W. Meij &J. A. Winter, Measures
Having Equivalent Effect, 13 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 76 (1976).
37. See D. Ehle, Mao3nahmen mit gleicher Wirkung wie mengenmaBige Beschrankungen
und ihre Abschaffung Im Gemeinsamen Markt, 125 AWD 453, 455 (1967); see generally R-C
B6raud, Les Mesures dEffet Equivalent au sens des Arts. 30 et suivants du Traiti de Rome,
REVUE TRIMESTRELLE DE DROIT EUROPtEN ("RTDE") 265 (1968); Dona-Viscardini, Les
Mesures d7,ffet Equivalent d des Restrictions Quantitatives, REVUE DE MARCHE COMMUN
("RMC") 224 (1973); P. Ulmer, Zum Verbot mittlebarer Einfuhrbeschrinkungen in EWG-Ver-
trag, GEWERBLICHER RECCHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INrERNATIONALER TElL ("GRUR
INT'L") 502 (1973) (also critical of the Commission's viewpoint); C-D Ehlermann, Die
Bedeutung des Artikels 36 EWGVfiir Freiheit des Warenverkehrs, EUROPARECHT 1 (1973).
38. See L.W. GORMLEY, supra note 15, at 18.
39. See generally Commission Directive No. 70/50, O.J. L 13/29 (1969).
40. See Van Themaat, supra note 36, at 634.
41. See Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852.
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III. THE BASIC PRINCIPLE IN DASSONVILLE
The bouquet of a wee dram whiffed through the salle des pas
perdus at the ECJ, enriched no doubt by the prospect of continu-
ing parallel imports, with the handing down of the judgment in
Dassonville in which the ECJ proclaimed that "[a] 11 trading rules
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, di-
rectly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community
trade are to be considered as measures having an effect
equivalent to quantitative restrictions."42 This basic principle of
the definition of measures having equivalent effect has re-
mained, steadfast, ever since, although the reference to "trading
rules" is sometimes omitted, or replaced by "national rules" or
simply "rules," and very occasionally by "commercial rules.""3 It
remains thus the standard definition of measures having
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions, cited regularly and
relentlessly. The basic principle itself is very broad in its formu-
lation, although its effects are tempered by the development,
first in Dassonville itself 44 and more extensively in Rewe-Zentral AG
v. Bundesmonopolverwaltungfiir Branntwein (" Cassis de Dijon"), of
the case-law based justifications for measures, which stand in ad-
dition to the exceptions provided for in the EC Treaty itself.
The need for a broadly-formulated basic principle can be ex-
plained by a desire to limit as much as possible the room for
maneuver by the Member States in an effort to create or main-
tain in force barriers to intra-Community trade, while the devel-
opment of the case-law based justifications recognized on an eq-
uitable basis that there were certain legitimate interests or val-
ues, not thought of when the Treaty was drafted, which had to
be accepted, pending them being covered by Community mea-
42. See id. Dassonville concerned parallel imports of Scotch whisky (Johnnie
Walker and Vat 69).
43. The reference to "commercial rules" is in Commission v. Denmark, Case C-192/
01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-9693, 9736. As to some examples of the ECJ's varying approach, see
L.W. Gormley, The Definition of Measures Having Equivalent Effect, in CONTrINUITY AND
CHANGE EU LAW: EssAms IN HONOUR OF SIR FRAcisJACOBS 189, 193 (Anthony Arnull et
al. eds., 2008).
44. See Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852 (the
basic principle is set out in para. 5 of thejudgment, the first case-law based justifications
at para. 6).
45. See Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir Branntwein, Case 120/
78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, 662 [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon].
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sures, as deserving protection.46 In this context, the application
of the principles of necessity and proportionality, and by analogy
of the second sentence of Article 30 EC, served to ensure that
these newjustifications, just as the EC Treaty-based justifications,
should not be misused. A balancing of interests in the round
thus took place. The downside of a wide basic principle is the
temptation, which lawyers and their clients could not resist, to
probe the limits of the definition: did the ECJ really mean what
it said, or even say what it meant?
IV. APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE FROM DASSONVILLE
TO KECK
Some evident themes in the case-law were fairly easily devel-
oped, applying the basic principle in Dassonville, as a few exam-
ples demonstrate: the promotion of national products,47 or
favoring of national contractors over those in other Member
States, 48 and "local grab" measures49 were readily caught by the
basic principle; insistence on repeating inspections already car-
ried out in the exporting Member States5" was painlessly found
to be a barrier to intra-Community trade, import bans,51 import
license requirements, 52 and prior authorization requirements, 53
requirements that a representative be established in the Member
46. See L.W. Gormley, supra note 15, at 52-53.
47. See, e.g., Commission v. Ireland, Case 249/81, [1982] E.C.R. 4005; Apple &
Pear Development Council v. K. J. Lewis Ltd., Case 222/82, [1983] E.C.R. 4083;
Jongeneel Kaas BV v. Netherlands, Case 237/82, [1984] E.C.R. 483; Commission v.
France, Case 152/78, [1980 E.C.R. 2299.
48. See, e.g., Commission v. Ireland, Case 45/87, [1988] E.C.R. 4929; Du Pont de
Nemours Italiana SpA v. UnitA Sanitaria Locale No. 2 di Carrara, Case C-21/88, [1990]
E.C.R. 1-889.
49. See, e.g., Commission v. Italy, Case C-235/89, [1992] E.C.R. 1-776; Commission
v. United Kingdom, Case C-30/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-829.
50. See, e.g., Officier van Justitie v. De Peijper, Case 104/75, [1976] E.C.R. 613;
United Foods NV v. Belgium, Case 132/80, [1981] E.C.R. 995; Criminal Proceedings
Against Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Biologische Producten BV, Case 272/80,
[19811 E.C.R. 3277.
51. See, e.g., Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Risi, Case 2/73, [1973] E.C.R. 865; Commis-
sion v. France, Case 232/78, [1979] E.C.R. 2729.
52. See, e.g., Int'l Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, Cases 51-
54/71, [1971] E.C.R. 1107; Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 121/81, [1983]
E.C.R. 203.
53. See, e.g., Commission v. Italy, Case C-249/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4311.
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State of importation,54 requirements that goods be presented or
put up in a certain way,55 origin marking requirements, 56 confin-
ing names to domestic products only, 57 certain effects of price-
regulatory measures, 58 and administrative practices, 59 all fell foul
of the basic principle, without too much logical difficulty. It also
became clear that Article 28 EC was not merely concerned with
the prohibition of restriction on trade between Member States,
but involved a positive obligation on Member States to accept
products coming from each other. The foundations of the con-
cept of mutual acceptance were laid in relation to the recogni-
tion of public sector tests and inspections, 60 but became more
generally apparent in the celebrated judgment in Cassis de Di-
jon,6 1 which came to public prominence through the Communi-
cation on the consequences of the Cassis de Dijon judgment is-
sued by the Commission.62 However, Cassis de Dijon contained
two central errors: first, the ECJ spoke about goods "lawfully
54. See, e.g., Commission v. Belgium, Case 155/82, [1983] E.C.R. 531; Commission
v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 247/81, [1984] E.C.R. 1111.
55. See, e.g., Criminal Proceedings Against Fietje, Case 27/80, [1980] E.C.R. 3839;
Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt PvbA, Case 261/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3961.
56. See, e.g., Commission v. Ireland, Case 113/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1625; Commission
v. United Kingdom, Case 207/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1201.
57. See, e.g., Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 12/74, [1975]
E.C.R. 181; Job. Eggers Sohn & Co. v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Case 13/78, [1978]
E.C.R. 1935; Exporteur SA v. LOR SA, Case C-3/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-5529.
58. Discriminatory price regulatory measures fall clearly within the ambit of Art. 28
EC; equally applicable price-regulatory measures will have prohibited effects when they
have discriminatory effects against imported products. See, e.g., Tasca, Case 65/75,
[1976] E.C.R. 291; SA GB-INNO-BM v. Association des Detaillants en Tabac (ATAB),
Case 13/77, [1977] E.C.R. 2115; Openbaar Ministerie v. Van Tiggele, Case 82/77,
[1978] E.C.R. 25; Commission v. Italy, Case 78/82, [1983] E.C.R. 1955; Association des
Centres Distributeurs Edouard Leclerc v. Au B16 Vert Shrl, Case 229/83, [1985] E.C.R.
1.
59. See Commission v. France, Case 21/84, [1985] E.C.R. 1356, 13, in which the
ECJ pointed out that an isolated act did not amount to an administrative practice, there
had to be a certain degree of consistency and generality, although where there are very
few market participants in a particular sector, an attitude adopted to one company may
well be characterized as an administrative practice.
60. See, e.g., Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Risi, Case 2/73, [1973] E.C.R. 865; Commis-
sion v. France, Case 232/78, [1979] E.C.R. 2729.
61. See generally Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649.
62. See Communication from the Commission Concerning the Consequences of
theJudgment given by the Court ofJustice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 ("Cassis
de Dijon") (1980) O.J. C 256/2, at 2; see also R. Barents, New Developments in Measures
Having Equivalent Effects, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 271, 296 (1981); see generally L.W.
Gormley, Cassis de Dijon and the Communication from the Commission, 6 EUR. L. REv. 454
(1981).
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produced and marketed" in another Member State, whereas it
should have referred to goods lawfully produced or marketed in
another Member State," secondly, in the (illustrative) list ofjus-
tifications for measures, the ECJ referred to the protection of
public health. 64 This latter error was subsequently corrected by
the ECJ,65 although, surprisingly, the former never has been.
However, there started to emerge a series of cases of scant
integrationist merit, which severely tested the ECJ's willingness
to apply the basic principle logically. In Blesgen v. Belgium,66
which concerned liquor licensing, the ECJ dramatically failed to
apply the basic principle, instead finding that liquor licensing in
cafes had in reality nothing to do with imports of the spirits con-
cerned. This case is the most interesting example of the ECJ
kowtowing to pressures not to find the national measure con-
cerned in principle prohibited; it thus rejected the logical ap-
proach, which would have been to have found that the Belgian
measure was indeed capable of limiting the sales opportunities
for (largely imported), spirits, but nevertheless justified on
grounds of public policy (public order) or on the ground of be-
ing a legitimate measure in the interests of protection of the
health of young people. Pressure of this sort is something to
which regrettably, the ECJ is not quite as immune as it should
be, although it is fair to say that examples of spinelessness are
relatively few, but that does not diminish their notoriety.6 7
63. This is because of the effect of Art. 23(2) EC (free movement benefits not only
goods originating in the Community but also products coming from third countries
which are in free circulation in Member States). See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 23(2),
O.J. C 321 E/37, at 51. As to when products are in free circulation, see Art. 24 EC. See
id., art. 24, at 51.
64. This added absolutely nothing to "the protection of the life and health of
humans, animals, and plants" mentioned in Art. 30 EC. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art.
30, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 53.
65. See Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA v. Departamento de Sanidad y
Seguridad Social de la Generaliteit de Catalufia, Cases C-1 & 176/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-
4151, 4183-84.
66. See generally Blesgen v. Belgium, Case 75/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1211; see also
H. Krantz GmbH & Co. v. Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen, Case C-69/88, [1990]
E.C.R. 1-583.
67. Other notorious examples of highly dubious conclusions in the free movement
of goods area include Commission v. Belgium, Case C-2/90, [1992] E.C.R. 14431 (Wal-
loon waste in which the ECJ having decided that waste fell to be treated like any other
goods, went on to find that because of its special nature it was not a discriminatory
measure; the Walloon measure was upheld on environmental protection grounds when
it was manifestly discriminatory), and Belgium v. Spain, Case C-388/95, [2000] E.C.R. I-
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Blesgen looked as if it might cast a long shadow, although
those fears, like recent reports of Mark Twain's death, were
greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, lawyers continued to attack
measures restricting the circumstances in which goods could be
sold within Member States. Thus Sunday trading,68 sex shop li-
censing,6 9 and worker protection 70 provided fruitful ground for
litigation. To a certain extent, the ECJ could have limited this by
being clearer when first confronted with Sunday trading
problems. Implicitly it acknowledged that restrictions on Sun-
day trading were indeed measures which fell within the Das-
sonville basic principle;7 a reluctance to come to a concluded
view on whether the measures were justified, however, meant
that it was left up to the national courts to decide on the propor-
tionality of the measures. The option of leaving the decision
clearly in the hands of the national court is the route which the
ECJ tends to follow when it is paying lip service to (sometimes
exaggerated) national sensitivities. By the time the ECJ stated its
own view on Sunday trading, namely that the non-discriminatory
application of shop closing legislation appeared justified,7 2 law-
yers and litigants were no longer listening.73
3123, which reversed the finding in Ets Delhaize Frres et Compagnie Le Lion SA v.
Promalvin SA, Case C-49/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-3669. Outside the free movement of goods
see, e.g., Groener v. Minister for Education, Case C-379/89, [1989] E.C.R. 3967 and
The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ltd. v. Grogan, Case C-159/90,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-4865.
68. See generally Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q PLC, Case 145/88, [1989]
E.C.R. 3851; Union D~partementale des Syndicates CGT de I'Aisne v. SIDEF Con-
forama, Case C-312/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-997; Criminal Proceedings Against Mar-
chandise, Case C-332/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1027; Council of the City ofStoke-on-Trentv.
B & Q PLC, Case C-169/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6635; Rochdale Borough Council v. Anders,
Case C-306/88, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6457; Reading Borough Council v. Payless DIY Ltd.,
Case C-304/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6493.
69. See generally Quietlynn v. Southend Borough Council, Case C-23/89, [1990]
E.C.R. 1-3059; Sheptonhurst Ltd. v. Newham Borough Council, Case C-350/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-2387.
70. See generally Summary Proceedings Against Oebel, Case 155/80, [1981] E.C.R.
1993 (this pre-dated Blesgen v. Belgium, Case 75/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1211). Clear
worker protection arguments were also advanced in Union D6partementale des Syndicates
CGT de l'Aisne v. SIDEF Conforama, Case C-312/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-997 and Criminal
Proceedings Against Marchandise, Case C-332/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1027.
71. See Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q PLC, Case 145/88, [1989] E.C.R. 3851,
10-19.
72. See Union D~partementale des Syndicates CGT de L'Aisne v. SIDEF Con-
forama, Case C,312/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-997, 7-14; Criminal Proceedings against Mar-
chandise, Case C-332/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1027, 8-14.
73. Hence the references in Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent v. B & Q PLC,
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The second front of attack on national legislation, which re-
stricted the commercial freedom of market participants, took
place in relation to selling techniques: matters such as the pro-
hibition of the use of certain types of sales promotion cam-
paigns,74 the prohibition of doorstep selling, 75 and restrictions
on comparative advertising, 76 were perceived as standing in the
way of market penetration. In this series of cases, the conclusion
did not always favor the importer, as the ECJ often felt that the
measures, while undoubtedly capable of hindering trade be-
tween Member States, were justified. 77 But for lawyers and liti-
gants, what mattered was that they had their day in court at Com-
munity level: the ECJ was almost saying "bring me your tired,
your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free."78 Yet
this was ajanus approach: with one face the ECJ started to send
a message of simply not wanting to know about shop closing leg-
islation, yet with the other it seemed to relish its role as the ha-
ven of justice and mercy for the weary and hard-done-by partici-
pant in intra-Community trade.
These cases were brought under the preliminary reference
procedure, but the workload of the Commission's services, partly
as a result of the Commission's Communication, 79 partly as a re-
sult of the effect of the drive for the Internal Market,8" meant
Case C-169/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6635; Rochdale Borough Council v. Anders, Case C-
306/88, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6457, and Reading Borough Council v Payless DIY Ltd et al.,
Case C-304/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6493.
74. See generally Criminal Proceedings Against Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij
BV, Case 286/81, [1982] E.C.R. 4575.
75. See generally Buet & Educational Business Services (EBS) SARL v. Minist~re
Public, Case 382/87, [1989] E.C.R. 1235.
76. See generally GB-INNO-BM v. Conf~d~ration du Commerce Luxembourgeois,
Case C-362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-667; Schutz-verband Gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft
v. Yves Rocher GmbH, Case C-126/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2361.
77. See, e.g., Criminal Proceedings Against Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij BV,
Case 286/81, [1982] E.C.R. 4575; Buet & Educational Business Services (EBS) SARL v.
Minist~re Public, Case 382/87, [1989] E.C.R. 1235. As examples of unjustified mea-
sures, see GB-INNO-BM v. Confrd~ration du Commerce Luxembourgeois, Case C-362/
88, [1990] E.C.R 1-667; Schutzverband Gegen Unwesen in der WAirtschaft v. Yves
Rocher GmbH, Case C-126/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2361.
78. With Emma Lazarus.
79. See Communication from the Commission Concerning the Consequences Of
the Judgment Given by the Court ofJustice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 ("Cas-
sis de Dijon") (1980) O.J. C 256/2, at 2.
80. See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Mar-
ket: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final
Uune 1985); see generally 1992: ONE EUROPEAN MARKET? (R. Bieber et al. eds. 1988); the
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that the Commission's division specializing in Articles 28-30 in-
fringements was in the 1980's becoming ever more like a free
legal aid center for traders within the Community." What the
ECJ saw was merely the tip of the iceberg; fortunately most com-
plaints were resolved by the Member State concerned being per-
suaded to climb down, and sometimes it transpired that the com-
plaints were misconceived or unjustified. Discreditably, on occa-
sions, some Member States were not above persuading their
Commissioners' cabinets to engage in a little shoddy dealing to
close files, although such deals invariably compromised the
moral high ground of the cabinet with the internal market port-
folio for future occasions. One thing was certain: some people
wanted to press for reigning in the basic principle in Dassonville
(or perhaps for reigning in an extremely successful division).
Two members of the Commission's Legal Service, Marenco and
White, sought in different ways to question the wide application
of the basic principle. Marenco revived the old discrimination
criterion arguments,82 but his analysis was, with respect, not actu-
ally supported by the judgments he relied upon, as a close exam-
ination of the context of the statements concerned demon-
strates.83 In any event, a discrimination criterion for the scope of
Article 28 EC would be disastrous.8" White was more subtle: he
suggested that Article 28 should not regulate by whom, when,
how and where goods were sold, but should be confined to rules
affecting the characteristics of products (matters such as their
composition, presentation, size, shape, weight, denomination
and labeling).85 That analysis, although attracting much stimu-
entire 1989 first issue of LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION; P.P. CRAIG, THE
EVOLUTION OF THE SINGLE MARKET; THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET: UNPACK-
ING THE PREMISES (C. Barnard &J. Scott eds. 2002); L.W. Gormley, The Internal Market:
Histoiy and Evolution, in REGULATING THE INTERNAL MARKET 14 (N. Nic. Shuibnhe ed.
2006).
81. Lifting its lamp beside the golden door!
82. See generally G. Marenco, Pour une Interpretation Traditionelle de la Notion de
Mesure d'Effet Equivalent a une Restriction Quantitative, CAIERS nu DROIT EUROPEEN 211
(1984); see also, more nuanced, L. Defalque, Le Concept de Discrimination en Matiere de
Libre Circulation Des Marchandises, CAHIERS DU DROIT EUROPtEN 471 (1987).
83. See L.W. Gormley, supra note 15, at 263-64.
84. Indeed, it is only in relation to equally price-regulatory measures that the ECJ
has required a discriminatory effect before finding that Art. 28 EC is infringed; a similar
approach has been taken more generally to measures applicable without distinction as
to the destination of a product in relation to Art. 29 EC.
85. See generally E.L. White, In Search of Limits to Article 30 EEC Treaty, 26 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 235 (1989).
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lating academic discussion,86 did not find favor with the ECJ, at
least when first presented,87 and represented a position from
which the Commission would then withdraw.8 8 As Mortelmans
has observed,89 the Commission's position in its submissions in
Criminal Proceedings Against Keck was that in the light of the case-
law, a prohibition of resale at a loss could constitute an obstacle
to the importation of goods from other Member States, in so far
as a trader wishing to use the marketing strategy to publicize and
promote a product found himself obliged to renounce a method
which he considered to be effective. Although possible justifica-
tions on the grounds of consumer protection and fair trading
were considered by the Commission, it concluded that neither
justification could be made out. The ECJ, however, having
heard Advocate General Tesauro's Opinion in Ruth Hiinermund
v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wirttemberg ("Hiinermund") , 9
concluded otherwise, and the influence of White's views in the
formulation of the judgment in Keck9 should not be underesti-
mated either.9 2
86. See generally D. Chalmers, Free Movement of Goods within the European Community:
An Unhealthy Addiction to Scotch Whisky?, 41 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 269 (1993); L.W. Gor-
mley, Actually or Potentially, Directly or Indirectly? Obstacles to the Free Movement of Goods,
(1989) 9 YEARBOOK OF EUR. LAw ("YBEL") 197; L.W. Gormley, Free Movement of Goods,
LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION, 1, 9 (1989); K. Mortelmans, Article 30 of the EEC
Treaty and Legislation Relating to Market Circumstances: Time to Consider a New Definition, 28
C.M.L. REV. 115 (1991);J. Steiner, Drawing the Line: Uses and Abuses of Article 30 EEC, 29
C.M.L. REv. 749 (1992); W. Wils, The Search for the Rule in Article 30 EEC, 18 FUR. L. REv.
475 (1993).
87. In Torfaen Borough Council v. B & QPLC, Case 145/88, [1989] E.C.R. 3851, the
ECJ did not follow the Commission's arguments.
88. In the oral proceedings in Quietlynn it abandoned the position it took in
Torfaen (and thus the position it had taken in its written submissions in Quietlynn); the
ECJ simply adopted a Blesgen (see Blesgen v. Belgium, Case 75/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1211)
approach and applied a remoteness test. See Quietlynn v. Southend Borough Council,
Case C-23/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3059 [1990] E.C.R. 1-3059, 3081. The same approach
occurred in Sheptonhurst Ltd. v. Newham Borough Council, Case C-350/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-
2387.
89. NED. TUDSCHRIFT VOOR EUROPEES RECHT 247, 254 (2005).
90. Hfinermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-WMirttemberg, Case C-292/92,
[1993] E.C.R. 1-6787.
91. See Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 &
268/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, 6130.
92. As P. Oliver rightly observes. See P. OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 123 (2003). Mortelmans observes that the Commission's agents
in Criminal Proceedings Against Keck & Mithouard ("Keck") quickly sprung on board the
ECJ's line. See generally K. Mortelmans, Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and Legislation Related
to Market Circumstances: Time to Consider a New Definition, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 115
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Keck represented not so much a departure from Dassonville,
which it expressly upheld, as a nuancing of its application in the
case-law hitherto. Although reaction was heavily divided,93 it was
unanimous on at least one point: the ECJ had not clarified its
case-law; that was confirmed by the reaction of litigants.94 The
(1991); see also R. Wainwright & V. Melgar, Bilan de L'article 30Apres VingtAns deJurispru-
dence-de Dassonville d Keck et Mithouard, RMC 533 (1994). Mortelmans followed V.
Hatzopolous, LE PRINCIPE COMMUNAUTAIRE D'EQUIVALENCE DE RECONNAISSANCE MU-
TUELLE 252 (1999) in noting that Commission officials writing in their personal capacity
did not always follow the same line (thus A. Mattera, De L'arrt Dassonville d L'Arrit Keck:
L'obscure Clarti D'une Jurisprudence Riche en Principes Novateurs et en Contradictions I REV.
MARCHt UNIQUE EUR. 117 (1994) and the present author (who was a Commission offi-
cial from 1983-1990) in Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable Judgment in Keck and
Mithouard, 5 EUR. Bus. L. REV. 63 (1994) and Two Years After Keck, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
866 (1996) were merciless critics of the approach in Keck). But this is nothing new:
there has always been room for discussion, and the views of individual members of the
Commission's Legal Service were sometimes quite at odds with the views expressed by
those who were lawyers in the policy directorates general. Debate is healthy and en-
courages improved analysis. Some of the more unorthodox arguments (such as, with
respect, Marenco's, see G. Marenco, Pour une Interpretation Traditionelle de la Notion de
Mesure d'Effet Equivalent a une Restriction Quantitative, CAHIERS Du DROIT EUROPEEN 211
(1984)) have on occasions been picked up by some Member States to try to attack the
Commission's arguments in infringement proceedings in particular, although with no-
table lack of success. In the latter type of proceedings the influence of the directorate
general concerned is much greater: the Legal Service services the policymakers (and, as
always, represents the Commission before the ECJ), whereas in preparing the Commis-
sion's position on Art. 234 EC references, the Legal Service has greater influence, even
though the policymakers are consulted and involved.
93. The discussion of Keck has produced an enormous bibliography: as to exam-
ples of which, see the literature cited in P.J. G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 631-37 (L.W. Gormley ed.,
3rd ed. 1998); P. OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 123
(2003); P. Oliver & S. Enchelmaier, Free Movement of Goods, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
649, 674 (2007); and A. ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 427-
38 (2d ed. 2006). See in particular, L.W. Gormley, Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable
Judgment in Keck and Mithouard, 5 EUR. Bus. L. REv. 63 (1994) and Two Years After Keck,
19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 866 (1996); R. Joliet, The Free Circulation of Goods: the Keck and
Mithouard Decision and the New Directions in the Case Law, I COLUM. J. EUR. L. 436 (1995);
M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court: The European Court ofJustice and the European Economic
Constitution: A Critical Reading of Article 30 EC Treaty, 3 EUR. L.J. 55 (1998); A. Mattera,
De L arrit Dassonville d L arrgt Keck: L'obscure clart6 d'une Jurisprudence riche en Principes
novateurs et en Contradictions, Revue du March Unique Europhen 117 (1994); F. Picod,
La Nouvelle Approche de la Cour deJustice en Matiere d'Entraves aux Echanges, RTDE 169
(1998); R. Wainwright & V. Melgar, Bilan de L'article 30 Apres Vingt Ans dejurisprudence-
de Dassonville d Keck et Mithouard, RMC 533 (1994); J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of the
Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolution of the Free Movement of Goods, in
THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW, 349, 349 (P. Craig & G. De Bdrca eds. 1999), and S.
Weatherill, After Keck: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarification, 33 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 885 (1996).
94. This was particularly demonstrated by the series of shop opening hours or Sun-
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views on Keck are extremely well-known, so just a few brief com-
ments will suffice, with the minimum of repetition. The ECJ's
reasoning was terse and motivated solely by managerial con-
cerns:
In view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article
30 of the Treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose
effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where such
rules are not aimed at products from other Member States,
the Court considers it necessary to re-examine and clarify its
case-law on this matter.
95
A textual change occurred between the judgment as handed
down and the judgment as reported, at least as far as the English-
language version was concerned. Thus originally, the following
paragraph (15) read:
In Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmono-
polverwaltung fir Branntwein [1979] E.C.R. 649) it was held
that, in the absence of harmonisation of legislation, measures
of equivalent effect prohibited by Article 30 include obstacles
to the free movement of goods where they are the conse-
quences of applying rules that lay down requirements to be
met by goods (such as requirements as to designation, form,
size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling, packaging)
to goods from other Member States where they are lawfully
manufactured and marketed, even if those rules apply with-
out distinction to all products unless the application can be
justified by a public interest objective taking precedence over
the free movement of goods.
By the time of publication in the European Court Reports,
that had become:
It is established by the case-law, beginning with 'Cassis de Di-
jon' (Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltungfiir
Branntwein [1979] E.C.R. 649) that, in the absence of
harmonisation of legislation, obstacles to free movement of
goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods com-
ing from other Member States where they are lawfully manu-
day trading cases post-Keck. See generally Criminal Proceedings Against Tankstation't
Heuske Vof & Boermans, Joined Cases C-401 & 402/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2199; Punto
Casa v. Sindaco del Comune di Capena, Joined Cases C-69 & 258/93, [1994] E.C.R. I-
2355; Semerano Mobil Srl v. Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco, Cases C-418-424/93,
[1996] E.C.R. 1-2975.
95. See Criminal Proceedings Against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 &
268/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, 14.
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factured and marketed, rules that laid down requirements to
be met by such goods (such as those relating to designation,
form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling, pack-
aging) constitute measures of equivalent effect prohibited by
Article 30. This is so even if those rules apply without distinc-
tion to all products unless the application can bejustified by a
public-interest objective taking precedence over the free
movement of goods.96
The English text was now in line with the original French text.
9 7
The ECJ continued:
By contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, the
application to products from other Member States of national
provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrange-
ments is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually
or potentially, trade between Member States within the mean-
ing of the Dassonville judgment (Case 8/74 [1974] E.C.R.
837), so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders
operating within the national territory and so long as they af-
fect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of
domestic products and of those from other Member States.
Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application of
such rules to the sale of products from another member state
meeting the requirements laid down by that state is not by
nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to im-
pede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic
products. Such rules therefore fall outside the scope of Arti-
cle [28] of the Treaty.98
From the above, it is indeed clear that the basic principle in Das-
sonville was not being thrown overboard, but its application was
being nuanced. The ECJ had clearly had enormous difficulties
with Keck; this is evident from the fact that the case was initially
96. Criminal Proceedings Against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 & 268/
91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, 6131. The author cited the original version in the following
articles: Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable Judgment in Keck and Mithouard, 5 EUR.
Bus. L. REv. 63, 63 (1994) and Two Years After Keck, 19 FORDHAM INT'IL L.J. 866, 869
(1996). But, as noted in L.W. Gormley, The Definition of Measures Having Equivalent Ef-
fect, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE EU LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR FRANCISJACOBS 189,
196 (Anthony Arnull et al. eds. 2008), he was not the only writer who did so. In order
that readers of this Journal not be misled, it seemed sensible to repeat the point made in
that latter contribution here: mea culpa!
97. Thus meeting one of the author's points in both articles by Gormley, supra
note 93.
98. Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 & 268/
91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, 6132.
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before the Second Chamber, but, after Advocate General van
Gerven had delivered his Opinion,99 it was assigned to the Full
Court, which decided to reopen the oral procedure, and to put
specific questions to the parties which had submitted observa-
tions.1"' A few weeks earlier, Advocate General Tesauro, in a
case dealing with the rules of a professional body regulating
pharmacists which prohibited the latter from advertising para-
pharmaceutical products outside their pharmacies,' had called
on the ECJ to change its mind and, for this to be useful, to do so
clearly and explicitly."0 2 He posed a strategic question: "Is Arti-
cle [28] of the Treaty a provision intended to liberalize intra-
Community trade or is it intended more generally to encourage
the unhindered pursuit of commerce in individual Member
States?"'0° To be sure he was really setting his sights on examin-
ing measures which were of general application, having an ad-
verse effect on the demand for goods to which they applied, and
therefore entailing a reduction in the volume of sales and ulti-
mately, as a result of this on imports as well, even though the
measures applied irrespective of the origin of the product; more
specifically, he was looking at whether the resulting reduction in
trade-remote, indirect and contingent, and in any case merely
hypothetical-was sufficient to bring the measure within the am-
bit of Article 28 EC. 1°4 He summarized his conclusions in the
following terms:
I am persuaded that the Dassonville test neither can nor
should be so construed as to include in the definition of mea-
sures having equivalent effect even those national laws which,
because they affect supply and/or demand and therefore, but
on that account alone, the volume of sales, may bring about a
reduction in the volume of imports, that is to say, where there
exists no obstacle whatsoever to the movement within the
Community of the products concerned and no connection
whatsoever with the disparity between the laws in question.
99. Mr. Van Gerven had little difficulty in concluding that the rules involved were
in principle covered by Article 28 EC. See Keck, Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, [1993]
E.C.R. 1-6097, 6112-13.
100. For the details, see Keck, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, 6102.
101. See generally Hfinermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-WtOrttemberg,
Case C-292/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6787.
102. See id. at 6813.
103. See id. at 6800.
104. See id. at 6802-03.
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I consider that the purpose of Article [28] is to ensure the
free movement of goods in order to establish a single inte-
grated market, eliminating therefore those national measures
which in any way create an obstacle to or even mere difficul-
ties for the movement of goods; its purpose is not to strike
down the most widely differing measures in order, essentially,
to ensure the greatest possible expansion of trade.1
0 5
A couple of brief points should be made about this view: Mr.
Tesauro was the first to admit that he had changed his mind;'t 6
he was also honest enough to state which judgments he now felt
should not be followed. He was also not thinking in terms of a de
minimis approach, rather he was taking the line that the type of
measures involved really had nothing to do with intra-Commu-
nity trade, and that Article 28 EC should not be diverted from its
proper purpose. The author had already warned against abuse:
[L]itigants should not simply see Article [28 EC] as a panacea
to attack every local regulation of economic life willy-nilly.
Disputes alleging interference with inter-state trade should al-
ways have a genuine inter-state element, otherwise Article
[28] might fall into disrepute and national courts might be-
come reluctant to refer genuine disputes to the Court of Jus-
tice. That would not be a happy result.'0 7
Regrettably, litigants had not heeded that advice, and now paid
the price, although the ECJ in Keck was not as straightforward as
was Mr. Tesauro.'0 8 It is thus unsurprising that Advocates Gen-
eral as well as many learned writers were withering in their criti-
cism of the reasoning in Keck; indeed, Oliver rightly noted that
"the opprobrium which has been heaped on that ruling must be
almost without precedent."'0 9 The need for a genuine interstate
105. See id. at 6814. Mr Tesauro also pointed out that it was revealing that the
pharmacists in the instant case, in claiming the right to advertise the products con-
cerned, did not in any way argue that the measure constituted an obstacle to imports,
rather they complained that the measure put them at a disadvantage in comparison
with other shops selling the same products.
106. See id. at 6813.
107. See L.W. Gormley, Commentary on Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q PLC, 27
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 141, 150 (1990).
108. The court was unable or unwilling to reach specific agreement on what ear-
lierjudgments were being overruled and to what extent.
109. P. Oliver, Some Further Reflections on the Scope of Articles 28-30, 36 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 783, 793 (1999). Other celebrated victims of heaps of opprobrium include the
judgment in Van Zuylen Frires v. HagAG, Case 192/73, [1974] E.C.R. 731, and (certainly
deserving of opprobrium) Commission v. Belgium, Case C-2/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-4431
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element has come under pressure in recent years, however, as is
discussed below. Unsurprisingly, the result" 0 in Hzinermund fol-
lows the line in Keck.
The Keck interpretation of Dassonville does not attempt to
cover all types of measures which can fall under the Dassonville
basic principle; it merely sought to deal with what may be called
the non-discriminatory regulation of socio-economic life to
bring the use of Dassonville back to its intended ambit. The
world of measures having equivalent effect is not restricted to
classifications as either product-bound restrictions or selling ar-
rangements; there may well be measures which are neither: this
is particularly true in respect of measures which discriminate in
law or in fact against imports. It is still good law that it is unnec-
essary to demonstrate discrimination to find a breach of Article
28 EC. In any event, it is clear that in para. 15 of the judgment in
Keck the ECJ was not seeking to give an exhaustive list of mea-
sures having equivalent effect. The point that the ECJ's reason-
ing is wholly contradictory-first finding that the measure could
have an effect on intra-Community trade and then concluding
that this did not amount to a measure having equivalent effect-
-remains a major flaw in the judgment. But standing common
sense on its head seemed to be in fashion."'
V. THE MODERN CASE-LAW
The case-law since Keck has confirmed that the ECJ failed in
its attempt at clarification of its case-law in thatjudgment. Never-
theless, soup is consumed less hot than it is served, and talk of a
revolution' 12 was perhaps premature, in respect of Keck at least;
to describe it as an evolution would now seem more appropriate.
This discussion of the modern case-law naturally focuses on how
the Keck approach has worked out in practice, the question of a
(Walloon waste). It is worth comparing that judgment with Du Pont de Nemours Italiana
SpA v. Unitd Sanitaria Locale No. 2 di Carrara, Case C-21/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-889 which in
legal terms is the parallel of Walloon Waste in another context; see also supra note 67
for are well-known examples of reasoning which, on its core elements, fails to convince.
110. The measure was found not to fall within the ambit of Art. 28 EC, see
Hiinermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wiirttemberg, Case C-292/92 [1993] E.C.R. 1-
6787, 6823, on the same reasoning as that used in Keck.
111. As in Commission v. Belgium, Case C-2/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-4431.
112. N. Reich, The "November Revolution" of the European Court of Justice: Keck, Meng
and Audi Revisited, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 459 (1994).
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de minimis approach, and the requirement of an interstate ele-
ment.
A. Keck in Practice
The concept of certain selling arrangements was left unde-
fined in Keck, presumably because of a failure to be able to agree
on a definition of selling arrangements. Subsequent judgments
indicate that it embraces legislation restricting who may sell
goods and/or where and/or when they may be sold," l' advertis-
ing restrictions... (other than those which are related to the
presentation or packaging of the product itself115 or which act as
a total barrier to market entry" 6), and, as far as concerns resale
conditions, price control legislation,117 but the situation regard-
ing legislation controlling the conditions under which goods are
sold may not be quite so clear cut.1 18 The ECJ has rightly re-
113. See generally Commission v. Greece, Case C-391/92, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1621;
Criminal Proceedings Against Tankstation't Heuske Vof & Boermans, Cases C-401 &
402/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2199; Punto Casa SpA v. Sindaco del Commune di Capena,
Cases C-69 & 258/93, (1994] E.C.R. 1-2355; Criminal Proceedings Against Banchero,
Case C-387/93 [1995] E.C.R. 1-4663; Semeraro Casa Uno Sri v. Sindaco del Commune
di Erbusco, Joined Cases C-418-424/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-2975. But see Schutzverband
gegen Unlauteren Wettbewerb v. TK Heimdienst Sass GmbH, Case C-254/98, [2000]
E.C.R. 1-151.
114. See generally Hinermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-WO rttemberg,
Case C-292/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6787; Societt5 d'importation Edouard Leclerc v. TFI
Publicit6 SA, Case C-412/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-179.
115. See generally Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe K61n e V v. Mars
GmbH, Case C-370/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1923; Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags-
und Vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, Case C-368/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3689.
116. See generally Konsumentenombudsmannen (KO) v. De Agiostini (Svenska)
F6rlag AB, Joined Cases C-34-36/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3843, 3891-92; Konsumente-
nombudsmannen (KO) v. Gourmet International Products AB (GIP), Case C-405/98,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-1795, 1823-24.
117. See generally Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-
267 & 268/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097; Groupement National des Negociants en Pommes
de Terre (Belgapom) v. ITM Belgium SA, Case C-63/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-2467. The old
cases on price controls are still good law because they rely on the discriminatory effect
of the legislation (and if there is discrimination, even a classification of a measure as a
selling arrangement will not let the measure escape the ambit of Art. 28 EC).
118. Contrast the analysis in Morellato v. Comune di Padova, Case C-416/00, [2003]
E.C.R. 9343, with that in Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE v. Elliniko Dimosio, Cases C-158 & 159/
04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-8135 and Commission v. Greece, Case C-82/05, [2006] E.C.R. 1-93,
relating to the marketing of "bake-off" products. The distinction between the analysis
results from the effects of the measures concerned. In Morellato, the requirement for
prior packaging of bread which had been pre-baked off the premises before being fi-
nally baked on the premises was in principle found to fall outside the scope of Art. 28
EC, unless it could be shown that in reality it constituted discrimination against im-
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sisted the siren calls of the Member States to expand the scope
of "selling arrangements" to apply the Keck reasoning outside the
field of the free movement of goods." ' Moreover, requirements
which necessitate a change in the product or affect its packaging
will clearly not constitute selling arrangements. 20 Such product-
bound measures will be straightforwardly judged on the lines of
Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, but, as noted above, measures
which fall foul of the basic principle in Dassonville and thus of
Article 28 EC are not restricted to product-bound measures or
selling arrangements which do not satisfy the Keck conditions.
If a measure has been classified as a selling arrangement as
such, the logical next step is to examine whether the two condi-
tions set by Keck which have to be met if the measure is to escape
the ambit of the basic principle in Dassonville and thus of Article
28 EC. The first of these is that the measure must apply to all
affected traders operating within the national territory. This has
been the subject of relatively little discussion; 12' and on one oc-
ported products (which the ECJ left it up to the national court to decide, while noting
that if the latter found that there was discrimination, no justification on grounds of the
protection of the health and life of humans could be made out under Art. 30 EC). In
the latter judgments the ECJ condemned Greek legislation which made the sale of
"bake-off" products subject to the same requirements as those applicable to the full
manufacturing and marketing procedure for traditional bread and bakery products.
The suggestion by Advocate General Poaires Maduro in Alfa Vita that the Keck princi-
ples be somewhat adapted found no favor with the ECJ, and the weaknesses of his pro-
posed analysis have been well demonstrated by P. Oliver & S. Enchelmaier, Free Move-
ment of Goods, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 649, 676-77 (2007). See also, generally, S. En-
chelmaier, The ECJ's Recent Case Law on the Free Movement of Goods: Movement in All Sorts of
Directions [2007] 26 YBEL 115-56 (published while this contribution was in proof).
119. See Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financifn, Case C-384/93, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-1141, 1177-78; Union Royale Belge des Sociot~s de Football Association v. Bos-
man, Case C-415/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4921, 5070-71. See also G. Tesauro, The Commu-
nity's Internal Market in Light of the Recent Case-Law of the Court of Justice, 15 YBEL 1, 7
(1995).
120. The ECJ has held that the need, resulting from the measures at issue, to alter
the packaging or the labeling of imported products prevents those measures from con-
cerning selling arrangements for the products within the meaning of the judgment in
Criminal Proceedings Against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, [1993]
E.C.R. 1-6097. See Colim NV v. Bigg's Continent Noord NV, Case C-33/97, [1999]
E.C.R. 1-3175, 1 37; Commission v. Spain, Case C-12/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-459, 76;
Morellato, Case C-416/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-9343, 1 29. It is worth noting that in Morellato
it was precisely "bake-off" bread which had to be presented packaged, and such bread
in pre-baked form was usually imported (in particular from France).
121. It is relatively easy to ascertain whether this condition is met, but it is not
often examined. It was, however, expressly mentioned in Konsumentenombudsman v. De
Agostini (Svenska) FrlagAB, Joined Cases C-34-36/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3843, 3890 and in
Dentscher Apotherkerverbund eV v. 0800 Doc Morris NV, Case C-222/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-
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casion the argument that such a measure in fact operated to pe-
nalize small traders more heavily than larger firms got short
shrift indeed. 12 2 It seems that the real aim of this first condition
simply to ensure that there is no distinction (particularly on the
basis of nationality or residence) as to the scope of those affected
by the measure: it must be universally applicable to all market
participants in the Member State concerned. The second condi-
tion, that the measures affect in the same manner, in law and in
fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from
other Member States, has given rise to more interesting analysis.
Despite a very unpromising start, 123 there has been some consid-
erable movement in the ECJ's approach. Thus, for example, in
Schutzverband gegen Unlauteren Wettbewerb v. TK Heimdienst Sass
GmbH ("TK Heimdienst")124 the ECJ looked at Austrian legisla-
tion preventing bakers, butchers, and grocers from making sales
on rounds in a given administrative district unless they also carry
on their trade at a permanent establishment situated in that dis-
trict or in an adjacent municipality, where they also offer for sale
the same goods as they do on their rounds. It had no difficulty
concluding that this was a selling arrangement, and, implicitly
that it applied to all market participants, it held that it did not
affect in the same manner the marketing of domestic products
and that of products from other Member States. Although local
operators could meet this requirement of permanent establish-
ment, those from other Member States would have to bear addi-
tional costs to comply with that requirement. While though the
measure was equally applicable to domestic and foreign butch-
ers, bakers and grocers, the ECJ noted that it was unnecessary for
a measure to have the effect of favoring national products as a
whole or of placing only imported products at a disadvantage
and not national products for the measure to be found to have
discriminatory or protective effects in relation to the free move-
ment of goods. This is in line with the approach taken to local
14887, 14985, and implicitly so in Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Rundfunkanstalten (ARD) v.
PRO Sieben Media GmbH, Case C-6/98, [1999] E.C.R. 1-7599, 7636; on other occasions
the ECJ merely trots out the two Keck criteria without further specification.
122. See generally Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v. Sindaco del Commune di Erbusco,
Joined Cases C-418-424/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-2975.
123. See generally Commission v. Greece, Case C-391/92, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1621
(dealing with measures restricting where processed milk for infants could be sold).
124. Schutzverband Gegen Unlauteren Wettbewerb v. TK Heimdienst Sass GmbH,
Case C-254/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-151.
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grab measures designed to advantage the supply of goods and
services by firms established a particular region of a Member
State. 
25
Taking this approach further, in Deutscher Apotherkerverbund
eV v. 0800 Doc Moms NV ("Doc Morris"),126 having observed that
"even if the measure is not intended to regulate trade in goods
between the Member States, the determining factor is its effect,
actual or potential on intra-community trade,"'2 7 the ECJ gave
the following summary of the second Keck criterion:
In order to ascertain whether a particular measure affects in
the same manner the marketing of both domestic products
and those from other Member States, the scope of the restric-
tive measure concerned must be ascertained. Thus, the court
has found that a prohibition on pharmacists from advertising
quasi-pharmaceutical products outside the pharmacy, which
they were authorised to offer for sale, did not affect the ability
of traders other than pharmacists to advertise those products
(see Huinermund, paragraph 19). Similarly, the prohibition on
broadcasting the advertising at issue in Leclerc-Siplec was not
extensive, since it covered only one particular form of promo-
tion (television advertising) of one particular method of mar-
keting products (distribution) (see Leclerc-Siplec, paragraph
22).
By contrast, the Court has accepted the relevance of the argu-
ment that a prohibition on television advertising deprived a
trader of the only effective form of promotion which would
have enabled it to penetrate a national market (see De Agos-
tini and TV-Shop, paragraph 43). Furthermore, the court has
found that in the case of products such as alcoholic bever-
ages, the consumption of which is linked to traditional social
practices and to local habits and customs, prohibiting all ad-
vertising directed at consumers in the form of advertisements
in the press, on the radio and on television, the direct mailing
of unsolicited material or the placing of posters on the public
125. See, e.g., Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v. Unit Sanitaria Locale No. 2 di
Carrara, Case C-21/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-889. Similar thinking lies behind the judgment
in Criminal Proceedings Against Mutsch, Case 137/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2681 and Criminal
Proceedings Against Bickel & Franz, Case C-274/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7637, in relation to
persons (restricting the use of a language to those national citizens speaking the lan-
guage concerned).
126. Deutscher Apotherkerverbund eV v. 0800 Doc Morris NV, Case C-222/01,
[2003] E.C.R. 1-14887.
127. See id. at 14984; see also Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG,
Case C-244/06, 27 (ECJ Feb. 14, 2008) (not yet reported).
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highway is liable to impede access to the market for products
from other Member States more than it impedes access for
domestic products, with which consumers are instantly more
familiar (see Case C-405/98 Gourmet International Products
[20011 E.C.R. 1-1795, paragraphs 21 and 24).128
The ECJ found that it was undisputed that there was a require-
ment that certain medicines be sold only in pharmacies and that
there was a prohibition on mail-order sales of medicines; while
the latter prohibition could be regarded as merely the conse-
quence of the first requirement, the emergence of the internet
as a method of cross-border sales meant that the scope and effect
of the prohibition had to be viewed broadly. The prohibition
was found to be more of an obstacle to pharmacies outside Ger-
many than to those in Germany; although there was little doubt
that as a result of the prohibition, pharmacies in Germany could
not use the extra or alternative method of gaining access to the
German market consisting of end consumers of medicinal prod-
ucts, they were still able to sell the products in their dispensaries.
But for pharmacies not established in Germany, the internet of-
fered a more significant way to gain direct access to the German
market. Given that a prohibition which had a greater impact on
pharmacies established outside German territory could impede
access to the German market for products from other Member
States more than it impedes access for domestic products, the
ECJ concluded that the prohibition did not affect the sale of do-
mestic medicines in the same way as it affected the sale of those
coming from other Member States. The German rules kept for-
eign pharmacies out of the market, whereas although the do-
mestic pharmacies had their marketing possibilities curtailed,
the market was not wholly closed but channelled through na-
tional dispensaries.
It is always tempting for the ECJ to resolve the issues before
it, but, as has been demonstrated in relation to the pre-Keck case-
law, that can lead to yet more litigation. Thus it is notable that
in some recent case-law, the ECJ has seemed rather reluctant in
Article 234 EC references to take a view on whether the second
condition in Keck is actually met, leaving the factual analysis to
the referring court, although this really resulted from the scant
128. Deutscher Apotherkerverbund e V v. 0800 Doc Morris NV, Case C-222/01,
[2003] E.C.R. 1-14887, 14986.
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information before it. Thus, in Openbaar Ministerie v. Burmanjel 29
dealing with itinerant sales, the ECJ found that it did not have
sufficient information to reach a conclusion; in A-Punkt Schmuck-
handels GmbH v. Schmidt,'" it was unable to decide whether the
prohibition on marketing in private houses would affect the sale
of imported products more than that of domestic products.
A particularly disturbing development, which has clearly
given rise to the need for a great deal of further reflection by the
ECJ, is the approach advocated by Advocate General Kokott in
Aklagaren v. Mickelsson & Roos. 31 This case concerned a prose-
cution for having driven personal watercraft on August 8, 2004
on waters on which the use of personal watercraft was not per-
mitted; 32 the defendants relied inter alia on Articles 28 and 30
EC. The learned Advocate General proposed that the ECJ ex-
clude arrangements for the use of goods from the scope of the
basic principle in Dassonville and thus from Article 28 EC Treaty
in the same way as it had excluded certain selling arrangements
in Keck in response to the increasing tendency of traders to in-
voke Article 28 EC as a means of challenging any rules whose
effect was to limit their commercial freedom even where such
rules were not aimed at products from other Member States. 133
She noted that at present, in the context of arrangements for
use, ultimately individuals could even invoke Article 28 EC as a
means of challenging national rules whose effect is merely to
limit their general freedom of action. She took the view that na-
tional legislation which laid down arrangements for use for
products did not constitute a measure having equivalent effect
within the meaning of Article 28 EC so long as it applied to all
relevant traders operating within the national territory and so
long as it affected in the same manner, in law and in fact, the
marketing of domestic products and of those from other Mem-
ber States, and was not product-related. However, prohibitions
on use or national legislation which permitted only a marginal
129. Openbaar Ministerie v. Burmanjer, Case G-20/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-4133.
130. A-Punkt Schmuckhandels GmbH v. Schmidt, Case C-441/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-
2093.
131. Aklagaren v. Mickelsson & Roos, Case C-142/05 (pending case).
132. Use was permitted on general navigable waterways and on other waters where
permission had been granted. The ban on use was thus not total, but location-specific.
See id.
133. See Criminal Proceedings Against Keck & Mithouard, Cases 267 & 268/91,
[1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, 6131, 14.
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use for a product, in so far as they (virtually) prevented access to
the market for the product, would, she concluded, constitute
measures having equivalent effect which are prohibited under
Article 28 EC, unless they were justified under Article 30 EC or
by an imperative requirement.1 34 In order to support her view,
she mentioned two extreme examples: a prohibition on driving
cross-country vehicles off-road in forests and speed limits on mo-
torways. These, she felt, would constitute measures having an
equivalent effect: it could be argued that they possibly deter
people from purchasing a cross-country vehicle or a particularly
fast car because they could not use them as they wish and the
restriction on use thus constituted a potential hindrance for in-
tra-Community trade.1 15 With all due respect, not even the most
fervent advocate of the wide application of the basic principle in
Dassonville would argue that such examples were prohibited
under Community law. Even if (and it is submitted that such
non-discriminatory rules of use are so remote from intra-Com-
munity trade as to have nothing to do with it) it could be argued
that they fell within the basic principle in Dassonville, justifica-
tions of public policy, safety and environmental protection
would surely be so sufficiently evident that the case would be
laughed out of court.
Her Opinion was delivered on December 14, 2006, and has
clearly given the ECJ considerable difficulty. At the time of writ-
ing (February 2008) there was still no sign of the judgment be-
ing listed for handing down. Oliver and Enchelmaier have quite
rightly drawn attention to the serious problems with the ap-
proach of the learned Advocate General, which is, with respect,
fundamentally misconceived. 1 6 In the view of the author, the
134. See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Aklagaren v. Mickelsson & Roos,
Case C-142/05, 87 (pending case). She also concluded that national rules which also
laid down a prohibition on using personal watercraft in waters in respect of which the
county administrative boards had not yet taken any decision on whether protection of
the environment requires a prohibition on use there were disproportionate and there-
fore not justified unless they included a reasonable deadline by which the county ad-
ministrative boards had to have taken the relevant decisions.
135. See id. 1 45.
136. See P. Oliver & S. Enchelmaier, Free Movement of Goods, 44 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 649, 678-79 (2007). The core of the criticisms is threefold: first, it is unclear what
she means by "marginal use" of a product; secondly, distinction which she makes be-
tween the essence of product and its "technical requirements" is neither logical nor
sound. Her observation that the contested restriction does not require modifications to
be made the product distorts the issue: the prohibition could not be got round by
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arguments in Aklagaren v. Mickelsson & Roos based on Article 28
EC should be dismissed as complete red herrings. They can be
assimilated to the treatment of non-discriminatory shop closing
legislation, post-Keck: the products may not be used in these
places until such time as a specific decision has been taken as to
whether their use in those places can be permitted.
The contrast between the approach of Advocate General
Kokott in Aklagaren v. Mickelsson & Roos and that of Advocate
General Uger in Commission v. Italy137 is striking. He had no
difficulty in finding that an equally applicable Italian rule
prohibiting the towing of trailers by mopeds fell within the scope
of Article 28 EC:
[I] t is undeniable that, by imposing a general and absolute
prohibition on the towing of trailers by mopeds throughout
Italian territory, the national rules at issue impede the free
movement of goods and, in particular, that of trailers.
Although that prohibition relates only to mopeds, it seems to
me that the coupling of a trailer to a vehicle of that kind con-
stitutes a normal and frequently used means of transport, par-
ticularly in rural areas. However, those rules, although not
prohibiting imports of trailers and their marketing in Italy,
have the effect of limiting their use throughout Italian terri-
tory. I am therefore of the opinion that such a prohibition is
liable to limit opportunities for trade between the Italian Re-
public and the other Member States and to hamper imports
and the marketing in Italy of trailers from those States, even
though they are lawfully manufactured and marketed there.
In those circumstances, it seems to me that the national rules
at issue constitute a measure having an effect equivalent to a
quantitative restriction, in principle prohibited by Article 28
EC.
modification of the product. The suggestion that a total ban would be less damaging to
intra-Community trade than the imposition of certain limitations (such as engine horse-
power) is indeed novel. The third point they make is that adopting the learned Advo-
cate General's view would reverse much of the case-law decided since Cassis de Dijon. A
distinction between non-discriminatory (in law or in fact) restrictions on sale and re-
strictions on use is indeed nonsensical. 'hat is the point of prohibiting restrictions on
the sale of a product if it would be permissible to prohibit its use? Oliver and En-
chelmaier argue that her approach would have to cover possession as well (prohibiting
possession of a drink which failed to satisfy the minimum national requirements). See P.
Oliver & S. Enchelmaier, Free Movement of Goods, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REv. at 678-79.
137. Commission v. Italy, Case C-I 10/05 (pending case). The Opinion was handed
down on October 5, 2006, but by Order of March 7, 2007 the oral procedure was re-
opened and the case referred to the Grand Chamber.
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Mr. Lger went on to acknowledge that road safety-as an aspect
of the health and life of humans-could be a legitimate ground
for upholding the measures, but found that the Italian authori-
ties had not produced any evidence to show how the ban con-
tributed to road safety. While this case can be distinguished from
Aklagaren v. Mickelsson & Roos (which involved a ban on use in
places other than permitted places), it is submitted that the obvi-
ous road safety argument, even if not expressly motivated by the
Italian government, is something which the ECJ should not ig-
nore. Again, it is submitted, that the best approach would be to
laugh it out, or to say that the safety issues are so manifestly obvi-
ous as not to need specific details to be acceptable. 3
Safety issues and indeed the fight against crime have re-
cently been considered further by Advocate General Trstenjak in
Commission v. Portugal,39 which dealt with a national rule prohib-
iting the attachment of colored foil to the windows of motor ve-
hicles for the transport of persons or goods. Here the issue was
more straightforwardly concerned with the product as such. The
learned Advocate General had little difficulty in finding that this
meant that colored foil, which was lawfully produced and/or
marketed in other Member States, could not in effect be bought
in Portugal; she went on to find the Portuguese justifications un-
convincing. The Commission's argument was that Portuguese
drivers would be deterred from buying the foil because it was
illegal to apply it to their windscreens. In this product-based sce-
nario, Keck arguments played of course no part.
There have been two other recent assaults on Keck which
deserve attention; the views of the Advocates General being par-
ticularly interesting. In Douwe Egberts NV v. Westrom Pharma NV,1 4
Advocate General Geelhoed drew attention to the difficulties in
138. See id. Obviously, the Advocate General was right to point out that the party
seeking to rely on a justification must make out its case-this follows from long-stand-
ing case-law-but some points are just so self-evident thatjudicial notice could be taken
of them without more ado.
139. Opinion of 12 December, 2007. The ECJ held in Commission v. Portugal, Case
C-263/06 (10 Apr. 2008) that there was indeed a restriction within the meaning of Art.
28 EC and that the one argument advanced in justification (the need to check compli-
ance with the requirement that the driver and passengers wear seatbelts) was not made
out: it was excessive and disproportionate.
140. Douwe Egberts NV v. Westrom Pharma NV, Case C-239/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-
7007.
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applying the Keck approach in relation to advertising. 4 ' He
stressed the importance of advertising in assisting in the eco-
nomic inter-penetration which the common market and the in-
ternal market sought to achieve. 4 2 He argued that if a certain
form of advertising was indeed the only effective means of pene-
trating a certain market or if there were set patterns of consump-
tion in the national market, prohibiting advertising would always
seriously impede access to the market for products from other
Member States. This was also, in his view, true of a prohibition
of the advertising of new products which have been lawfully
manufactured and marketed in other Member States. 4 ' He saw
publicizing such products as essential if a market position were
to be gained. The fact that such a prohibition was as much of an
obstacle to the introduction into the market of similar new prod-
ucts manufactured and marketed in the Member State con-
cerned did not alter this point. What was decisive, Mr. Geelhoed
continued, was that the product from another Member State was
prevented from gaining access to the market. In such a situa-
tion, compatibility with Articles 28 and 30 EC clearly had to be
comprehensively examined. Because designating national rules
as a selling arrangement results in those rules being taken
outside the scope of Article 28 EC, and so beyond the reach of
judicial control, he felt that the qualification of selling arrange-
ments should be reserved for rules which govern the general
conditions under which products are marketed, i.e. when, where
and by whom, and which do not specifically concern commer-
cialization as such. Thus rules dealing with matters such as times
141. Contrast the ECJ's approach in HIinermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-
Wairttemberg, Case C-292/92, [19931 E.C.R. 1-6787 and Socigtg d'Importation Edouard
Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicitd SA, Case C-412/93 [1995] E.C.R. 1-179 (limited scope adver-
tising bans found to be selling arrangements meeting the Keck criteria) with that in
Konsumentenombudsman v. De Agostini (Svenska) Firlag AB, Joined Cases C-34-36/95,
[1997] E.C.R. 1-3843 and Konsumentenombudsmannen (KO) v. Gourmet International Prod-
ucts AB (GIP), Case C-405/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-1795 (prohibition of dissemination of
advertising depriving foreign manufacturers of their only means of penetrating the
Swedish market to reach their target groups, and impeding market access for foreign
products more than access for domestic products with which potential consumers were
likely to be more familiar).
142. In this point, he built on the observations of Advocate General Jacobs in
Leclerc-Siplec, [1995] E.C.R. 1-179, 186-87. The right of the consumer to information,
and the importance of advertising therein was also the key to the judgment in GB-INNO-
BM v. Confedration du Commerce Luxembourgeois, Case C-362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-667.
143. Note that he kept to the Cassis de Dion formulation of "lawfully produced and
marketed." See Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, 3.
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and locations at which products are marketed have an effect pri-
marily on the volume of sales, but do not restrict access to the
market for the products concerned. Mr. Geelhoed argued for a
distinction between rules which include outright prohibitions,
and rules which govern the terms stricto sensu of advertising
messages. His examples of the latter were prohibitions of un-
sightly advertising, advertising in public buildings, and advertis-
ing certain products at certain events. Such rules did not provide
for an outright and general prohibition of advertising in the
marketing of products, but merely subjected it to conditions for
well-defined reasons. In other words, they did not prevent access
to the market or commercialization by other means and they did
not seek to restrict access to the market and were further re-
moved from marketing as such.'4 4 The ECJ found that the abso-
lute prohibition of advertising the characteristics of the product
was liable to impede access to the market by products from other
Member States more than it impeded access by domestic prod-
ucts, and dismissed the proffered justifications.14 5
Finally, Advocate General Poiares Maduro's most interest-
ing sally in Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE v. Elliniko Dimosio'4 6 deserves
some attention. Alfa-Vita, concerned conditions with which com-
144. See Douwe Egberts NV v. Westrom Pharma NV, [2004] E.C.R. 1-7007, 7032-33.
These considerations lead him to conclude that an outright prohibition of references
in advertising to slimming and to medical recommendations and attestations could not
be regarded as a selling arrangement within the meaning of Keck and had to be com-
prehensively examined for compatibility with Articles 28 and 30 EC. Put differently,
restrictions relating to the circumstances under which goods were sold, which did not
have the effect of preventing market penetration as such would be legitimate, thus plan-
ning-type restrictions or social control restrictions (such as a prohibition of selling alco-
holic beverages to persons below a certain age, or a prohibition of being in possession
alcohol at football matches) would not fall within the ambit of Article 28 EC. Of course
a wide application of the basic principle in Dassonville would not lead to a different
result, even though the approach would be very different: either laugh a challenge out
of court, on the ground that the rule was clearly irrelevant to intra-Community trade
and an abuse of process, or, if really pushed, apply the public policy or public health
justifications to uphold the measure.
145. See id. at 7059-60. Foodstuffs lawfully manufactured and marketed in other
Member States in which, particularly concerning health, were not misleading were per-
mitted under Community legislation and would be faced with restrictions on access to
the Belgian market in view of the prohibition of references in advertising to slimming
and medical recommendations, attestations, declarations, opinions or statements of ap-
proval (other than a statement that the product should not be consumed against medi-
cal advice). See id. at 7059.
146. Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE v. Elliniko Dimosio, Joined Cases C-158 & 159/04,
[2006] E.C.R. 1-8135, 33, 36, 40-41.
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pliance was required in order that "bake-off' products could be
finally baked on premises (the full requirements made of tradi-
tional bakeries were applicable). Mr. Poiares Maduro was con-
cerned about bringing the case-law on the free movement of
goods into line with that of the other freedoms.1 4 7 He felt that
the Member States had to take into consideration the effects of
their measures on citizens of the European Union as they sought
to exercise the freedom of the Treaty. With the greatest respect,
it has always been clear that the free movement of goods applies
irrespective of the nationality of the consignor, consignee, or
owner of the goods concerned; 4 8 although in Dassonville the
ECJ did talk about the means of proof required having to be
accessible to all Community nationals, that observation has not
been repeated in subsequent case-law, and was not meant to re-
strict access to the right of free movement of goods; it is irrele-
vant.149 Accordingly, it is submitted that the learned Advocate
General's first main criterion as an answer to Advocate General
Tesauro's question in Hiinermund, that any discrimination based
on nationality, direct or indirect had to be prohibited, cannot be
confined to EU citizens in relation to the free movement of
goods. Mr. Poaires Maduro then proposed that additional costs
resulting from discrepancies between the legislation of the Mem-
ber States would not as such amount to a hindrance to one of
the freedoms; only if they resulted from the failure by the Mem-
ber State concerned to take into consideration the specific situa-
tion of imports (in particular that they had to comply with re-
quirements of their Member State of origin) would they be
caught. On this view, product requirements would always be
caught, but rules relating to selling arrangements would be
caught only if they failed to take the specific situation of imports
into consideration. With respect, this is somewhat unclear: if
the Advocate General was saying that a mutual recognition
clause is required, that would involve transposing the approach
in Commission v. France15 (dealing with foie gras) from the field of
the requirement in which it is clearly appropriate into an area in
which it has no logical place. The third main criterion that he
147. See id.
148. See generally Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. S.A. Ch. Brachfeld &
Sons, Cases 2 & 3/69, [1969] E.C.R. 211, 223.
149. See LW. Gormley, supra note 15, at 22.
150. Commission v. France, Case C-184/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-6197.
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proposed was that a measure would be caught if it restricted
market access and the marketing of products from other Mem-
ber States more severely; it would be a hindrance to market ac-
cess if it protected the position of incumbents or if it rendered
intra-Community trade more onerous than trade on the national
market.'51 The ECJ declined to view the measures as selling ar-
rangements, finding that the Greek rules intended to prescribe
production conditions for bakery products (including "bake-off'
products) and did not take the specific nature of those products
into account; they also entailed extra costs and thus made the
marketing of "bake-off" products more difficult.'52
B. De Minimis?
Turning now to the question whether Keck could be seen as
entertaining a de minimis approach, it is now manifestly evident
that this was not the ECJ's intention. This is most apparent from
the rejection of the plea for a de minimis approach made in an
eloquent and elegant Opinion by Advocate General Jacobs
which was highly critical of Keck in Socit d'importation Edouard
Leclerc v. TFI Publicit SA ("Leclerc-Siplec").5 With respect, the
ECJ was right not to follow that path. Several reasons militate
against accepting a de minimis rule in the free movement of
goods. Most practically, at what level should the line be drawn?
Should it be a percentage of GDP; a percentage of the value of
the market (and what would be the relevant market?); the value
of a daily penalty on the Commission's guideline scales for pe-
nalizing Member States under Article 228 EC;1 54 the value of a
day's imports? Advocate General Tesauro understandably felt
that this would be a "very difficult, if not downright impossible"
exercise. 155 The position of the free movement of goods as a
fundamental freedom and foundation of the Community would
indeed be jeopardized by the introduction of a de minimis rule,
and the ECJ has (on this point at least) been consistent in re-
151. Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE v. Elliniko Dimosio,Joined Cases C-158 & 159/04,
[2006] E.C.R. 1-8135, 43-49.
152. See id. 18-19.
153. Soci6t6 d'importation Ifdouard Leclerc v. TFI Publicit6 SA, Case C-412/93,
[1995] E.C.R. 1-179, 194-97.
154. See Commission Communication, SEC 1658 (2005) (Application of Article
228 to the EC Treaty).
155. See Hfinermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wfirttemberg, Case C-
292/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6787, 6810-11.
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jecting it.'5 6 Moreover, the Member States are under a particu-
lar duty by virtue of Article 10 EC to secure the free movement
of goods,157 this must surely militate against accepting chinks in
the armor; indeed this point is also a valid criticism against the
whole approach of treating selling arrangements as a special case
outside the scope of Article 28 EC.
C. Intra-Community Trade
A few words are now appropriate about the requirement of
an effect on intra-Community trade. The ECJ found in Das-
sonville that direct or indirect, actual or potential hindrances of
intra-Community trade were caught by Article 28 EC.'58 Only in
so far as an equally-applicable measure hindered intra-Commu-
nity trade, would it have prohibited effects; thus, for example,
the German government was not obliged after the Commission v.
Federal Republic of Germany ("Reinheitsgebot") judgment 59 to
change the rules which applied to production of beer in Ger-
many, although it was obliged to bring the text of the law into
line with the requirements of Community law, thus to make it
clear that beer lawfully produced or marketed in another Mem-
ber State did not have to satisfy the recipe requirements for Ger-
man beer in order to be sold as beer in Germany (mere compli-
ance in practice is unacceptable). 60 As far as Community law is
concerned, Member States are free to discriminate against their
156. As to earlier authorities rejecting a de minimis argument, see Criminal Pro-
ceedings Against Prantl, Case 16/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1299, 1326; Criminal Proceedings
AgainstJan van de Haar & Kaveka de Meern BV, Cases 177/82 & 178/82, [1984] E.C.R.
1797, 1812-13; Commission v. France, Case 269/83, [1985] E.C.R. 837, 846; and Com-
mission v. Italy, Case 103/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1759, 1773. See, e.g., Radlberger Ge-
trankegesellschaft mbH & Co KG, S Spitz KG v. Land Baden-Wtfrttemberg, Case C-309/
02, [2005] E.C.R. 1-11763, 68. The ECJ has also recently confirmed in relation to a
transport ban that the fact that there are alternative routes or other means of transport
capable of allowing the goods in question to be transported does not negate the exis-
tence of an obstacle arising through a ban on the use of a particular route. See Commis-
sion v. Austria, Case C-320/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-9871, 1 67.
157. See Commission v. France [1997], Case C-265/95, E.C.R. 1-6959, 6999; Eugen
Schmidberger Internationale Transporte und Planzage v. Osterreich, Case C-112/00,
[2003] E.C.R. 1-5659, 5714-15.
158. See Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852.
159. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 178/84, [1987] E.C.R.
1227.
160. This follows by virtue of the Code du Travail Maritime judgment, Commission
v. France, Case 167/73, [1974] E.C.R. 359.
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own traders if they wish;1 6' thus the purpose of Article 28 EC
Treaty "is to eliminate obstacles to the importation of goods and
not to ensure that goods of national origin always enjoy the same
treatment as imported goods."'16 2 But if the facts of the dispute
actually involve no inter-State element a certain tension can de-
velop: on the one hand it can be argued that Community law on
free movement has nothing to say about restrictions wholly inter-
nal to a Member State, 163 yet a rule which imposes a charge every
time unworked marble crosses a municipal boundary will also
have an effect on trade between Member States, insofar as the
destination of a consignment is outside the territory of the Mem-
ber State concerned and elsewhere in the EU.' 64  So even
though the EC Treaty is silent on barriers to trade within a Mem-
ber State, the essence of the customs union, and the achieve-
ment of the unity of the common and internal market, even
more so since the abolition of systematic customs controls in in-
tra-Community trade since 1992, require the abolition within the
customs territory of the Community of all barriers to the move-
ment of goods within that territory, save for those justified under
Community law.' 6" Similarly, the fact that domestic products
from elsewhere in a Member State are also affected by, say, a
regional preference scheme, will not prevent the measure from
being caught by the basic principle in Dassonville.1 66  Even
161. See Driancourt v. Cognet, Case 355/85, [1986] E.C.R. 3231, 3241-42; Minis-
tore Public v. Mathot, Case 98/86, [1987] E.C.R. 809, 821.
162. See Minist~re Public v. Mathot, Case 98/86, [1987] E.C.R. 809, 821.
163. See, e.g., Procureur de la R~publique v. Waterkeyn, Cases 314-316/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 4337, 4360; Criminal Proceedings Against Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij BV,
Case 286/81, [1982] E.C.R. 4575, 4586; Driancourt v. Cognet, Case 355/85, [1986]
E.C.R. 3231, 3241-42. In relation to persons, The Queen v. Saunders, Case 175/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 1129, 1135, and in relation to services, Procureur du Roi v. Debauve, Case
52/79. [1980] E.C.R. 833, 855. See also Sodemare SA v. Regione Lombardia, Case C-70/
95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3395, 3435-36.
164. Thus in Carbonati Apuani Srl v. Comune di Carrara, Case C-72/03, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-8027, the ECJ found that such a measure constituted a charge having
equivalent effect to a customs duty, in breach of Art. 23 EC. The ECJ continued the
line of authority developed in Rend Lancry SA v. Direction Gdn~rale des Douanes,
Cases C-363 & 407-411/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3957, 3990-92.
165. This is the key to the reasoning behind Ren6Lancry SA v. Direction GMrale des
Douanes, Cases C-363, 407-411/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3957. The ECJ also thought that the
drafters of the EC Treaty had assumed that there were no charges similar to customs
duties within a Member State. Although the octroi de mer considered in Lanc7y had been
in existence since 1946, it is quite possible that the drafters of the EC Treaty simply
overlooked its existence.
166. See Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v. UnitA Sanitaria Locale No. 2 di Car-
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though all the facts of a specific case before a national court con-
fined to a single Member State, that does not necessarily mean
that Article 28 EC is inapplicable; 67 the application of the na-
tional measure may also have effect on free movement of goods
between Member States, particularly if the measure facilitates
the marketing of domestic goods to the detriment of imported
goods; in such circumstances, even if the application of the mea-
sure is restricted to domestic producers, the difference in treat-
ment between the two categories of goods concerned hinders, at
least potentially, intra-Community trade. 6 ' The fact that a mea-
sure in practice is not enforced against products coming from
other Member States will not save it from qualification as an ob-
stacle to trade between Member States. 69 Thus, the ECJ found
that France was not entitled to reserve the description "moun-
tain" to products manufactured on national territory and made
from domestic raw materials.170 Although Advocate General Ja-
cobs pressed the ECJ to decline to give a ruling on the Article 28
EC aspect, on the ground that the factual inter-State element was
absent,'7 1 the ECJ found little difficulty in pointing out the dis-
criminatory effect of the French rules, but did not deal with the
logical difficulty about the consequences of the application the
discrimination finding in a purely domestic situation.172 It is
submitted that the ECJ was right to assert jurisdiction, and while
it might have thought about the consequences, there is a power-
ful argument that these are solely a matter for the national
court.173 There may well be circumstances in which the national
law of a Member State would not permit reverse discrimination:
rara, Case C-21/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-889, 920; Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA v.
Departamento de Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generaliteit de Catalufia, Cases C-1
& 176/90, [1991] E.C.R. 14151, 4186; Ligur Carni Sri v. UnitA Sanitaria Locale no XV
di Genova, Case C-277/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6621 at 6661.
167. See Criminal Proceedings Against Pistre, Cases C-321-324/94, [1997] E.C.R. I-
2343, 2374.
168. See id. at 2374-75.
169. See id. at 2375; Commission v. France, Case C-184/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-6197,
6224. This is also in line with the approach in Commission v. France, Case 167/73,
[1974] E.C.R. 359.
170. See Criminal Proceedings Against Pistre, Cases C-321-324/94, [1997] E.C.R. I-
2343, 2376.
171. See id. at 2355-59.
172. See the discussion referred to in P. Oliver & S. Enchelmaier, Free Movement of
Goods, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 649, 657, supra, note 40.
173. In some ways the judgment in Criminal Proceedings Against Pistre, Cases C-321-
324/94, [1997] E.C.R. 1-2343, may be seen as answering the point that there was no
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equality before the law would mean that if a measure could not
be enforced against goods imported from another Member
State, it could not be enforced in a wholly domestic situation. So
in fact it would be the operation of national law which would
give to purely domestic operators the benefit of a finding by the
ECJ that a measure infringed Article 28 EC. That is the back-
ground against which the ECJ was willing to answer the ques-
tions posed in Criminal Proceedings Against Guimont,17 4 even
though the specific facts were entirely confined to France,
namely the cheese concerned was manufactured in France and
on sale there.175 The result is, then, that reverse discrimination
may result in some Member States but not in others, depending
on whether they have an equality rule. This is scarcely equal
treatment for all EU citizens, let alone all market participants; it
may give rise to distortions of competition, but at least in the
present state of Community law these are unavoidable, and there
appears to be no generic requirement on the Member States to
remedy this state of affairs.
D. Exports-An Old Peculiar?
The wording of Article 29 EC was (as the old Article 34 EEC
Treaty substantively) and is now identical, mutatis mutandis to
that of what is now Article 28 EC. As far as measures applicable
solely to exports to other Member States are concerned, it is in-
terpreted exactly as is Article 28 EC.' 7 6 Infamously, the ECJ de-
clined to apply the Dassonville basic principle without more ado
in the context of Article 29 EC in relation to measures having
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions, which are applica-
ble irrespective of the destination of the product.'77 This well
demonstrates that hard cases make bad law: the ECJ was clearly
evidence produced in Keck to demonstrate that the products in respect of which the
charges were laid were imported products.
174. Criminal Proceedings Against Guimont, Case C-448/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-
10663. The case concerned the requirement that Emmenthal cheese had to have a
rind if it were to be sold under that name in France.
175. See Douwe Egberts NV v. Westrom Pharma NV, Case C-293/02, [20041 E.C.R.
1-7037, 7060.
176. See generally Procureur de la Ripublique de Besan4on v. Bouhelier, Case 53/
76, [1977] E.C.R. 1-197.
177. See, e.g., PB Groenveld BV v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, Case 15/79,
[19791 E.C.R. 3409; Summary Proceedings Against Oebel, Case 155/80, [1981] E.C.R.
1993.
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swayed in PB Groenveld BV v. Produktschap voor Vee en 1lees
("Groenveld") 178 by the point that if the Dutch prohibition were
to be condemned it was likely that exports of Dutch processed
meat products (particularly to Anglo-Saxon countries) would
suffer. The ECJ found that Article 29 EC:
[C] oncerns national measures which have as their specific ob-
ject or effect the restriction of patterns of exports and thereby
the establishment of a difference in treatment between the
domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade in such
a way as to provide a particular advantage for national pro-
duction or for the domestic market of the State in question at
the expense of the production or of the trade of other Mem-
ber States.' 79
One consolation is that this formula adopted in Groenveld, al-
though contrary to Advocate General Capotorti's suggestion that
the basic principle in Dassonville be applied, nevertheless was suf-
ficiently wide to catch local grab measures.18 0 Nevertheless, it is
submitted that in Groenveld it would have been better to seek a
justification on the ground of consumer protection (maintain-
ing the reputation of Dutch processed meat products in the eyes
of the consumer). The ECJ's sally into a different approach for
exports than for imports as regards equally applicable measures
is distinctly unfortunate to say the least, but it has maintained its
stance consistently, t81 although in relation to equally applicable
measures in agricultural sectors covered by common organiza-
tion at the Community level, the ECJ seems to be concerned to
preserve the unity of the agricultural market and applies the nor-
mal Dassonville approach mutatis mutandis.'82 It is respectfully
submitted that revisitation and reconsideration of Groenveld is
178. See P B Groenveld BV v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, Case 15/79, [1979]
E.C.R. 3409, 7.
179. See id.
180. See, e.g., Commission v. France, Case 173/83, [1985] E.C.R. 491. As Belgium v.
Spain ("Rioja"), Case C-388/95, [2000] E.C.R. 1-3123, which reversed the finding in !EIs
Delhaize Freres et Compagnie Le Lion SA v. Promalvin SA, Case C-49/90, [1992] E.C.R. I-
3669, demonstrates, even local grab measures may be justified (although it has to be
said that the justification for reversing Delhaize was thin indeed, which has the whiff of
more political than legal motivation; in effect Spain was being rewarded for years of
non-compliance with the result of Delhaize).
181. See, e.g., Officier van Justitie v. Holdijk, Joined Cases 141-143/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 1299, 1313; Duphar BV v. Netherlands, Case 238/82, [1984] E.C.R. 523, 543;
Spain v. Council, Case C-9/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-1383, 1411.
182. See, e.g., Criminal Proceedings Against Vriend, Case 94/79, [1980] E.C.R. 327;
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long overdue. In this context, Roth 183 has suggested that there
should be a new definition of measures having equivalent effect
in Article 29 EC, to embrace all marketing restrictions as well as
product-bound measures applying to exports, irrespective of
whether they specifically aimed to discriminate against exports
or had that effect: Member States would therefore be obliged to
exempt goods intended for export from such restrictions, sub-
ject to this being justified, although measures which related to
conditions in which goods are produced, such as labor law, envi-
ronmental or planning rules would continue to be subject to a
discrimination-based test. Following this approach, Oliver'84 has
suggested that the language of the Groenveld test be reworded so
as to cover any measure which has the object or effect of treating
exports less favorably than goods intended for the domestic mar-
ket. It is, however, submitted that the view that the basic princi-
ple in Dassonville should be applied without more ado has rather
more to commend it.
VI. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MEASURES HAVING
EQUIVALENT EFFECT
A. General Observations
The principal grounds of justification for quantitative re-
strictions or measures having an effect are set out in the first
sentence of Article 30 EC.'1 5 A number of general principles
apply in respect of these grounds: measures which it has sought
to justify must be both necessary and proportionate;"' the inter-
Germany v. Deutsches Milch-Kontor GmbH, Case C-426/92; see also P.J.G. Kapteyn & P.
VerLoren van Themaat, supra note 93, at 649.
183. See W.H. ROTH, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR HANDELSRECHT 78 (1995).
184. See P. Oliver, Some Further Reflections on the Scope of Articles 28-30, (1999) 36
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 783, 803; see also Enchelmaier, supra note 118.
185. As to the text of art. 30 EC, see EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 30, O.J. C 321 E/
37, at 55. The security safeguard clauses of Arts. 297 & 298 EC are left to one side in
this discussion. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 297-98, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 174-75.
186. See Officier van Justitie v. De Peijper, Case 104/75, [1976] E.C.R. 613, 636;
Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 121/81, [1983] E.C.R. 203, 236; Commission v.
France, Case 42/82, [1983] E.C.R. 1083, 1087; Commission v. United Kingdom, Case
261/85, [1988] E.C.R. 547, 574; see also Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides
Media AG, Case C-244/06, 27 (ECJ Feb. 14, 2008) (not yet reported). Logically,
necessity and proportionality are separate: it may be necessary to protect health, but
the means by which this is done may be disproportionate; quite frequently, however,
the ECJ subsumes necessity and proportionality. In considering the proportionality of a
measure, regard may be had to (the length of) any transitional period for compliance.
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ests or values concerned are non-economic in nature, thus eco-
nomic justifications will not be entertained;'8 7 the burden of
proof that a measure is justified lies firmly on the party seeking
to justify it;"'8 it may be possible in exceptional circumstances to
justify a difference in treatment of domestic and imported prod-
ucts, where the measures taken have the same aim, although this
is highly exceptional." 9 The ECJ has consistently refused to add
to the interests or values expressed in the first sentence of Article
30 EC Treaty.1 90 The requirement expressed in the second sen-
tence of Article 30 EC, that measures which it has sought tojus-
tify must not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a
disguised restriction on trade between Member States, is seen by
the ECJ as being the source of the requirement that measures
which Member States seek to justify must be proportionate,' 9 '
but it is, with respect, more appropriately seen as an emergency
brake, which is designed to ensure that measures, which appear
ostensibly justified are not misused or distorted from the proper
purpose. 9 2 Thus, even if a justification can be made out, it may
fail because of the effect of the second sentence of Article 30 EC.
See Commission v. Germany, Case C-463/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-11705, 11760-61; see gener-
ally Commission v. Austria, Case C-320/03, [2005] E.C.R. 9871; Radlberger Ge-
trdnkegesellschaft mbH & Co. v. Land Baden-Wfirttemberg, Case C-309/02, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-11763.
187. See, e.g., Commission v. Italy, Case 7/61, [1961] E.C.R. 317, 329; Commission
v. Ireland, 288/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1761, 1776; Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employ~s
Priv~s, Case C-120/95, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1831, 1884. If, though, ajustification can genu-
inely be made out on a ground known to Community law, the fact there may result
desirable economic effects for the Member State will not be fatal to thejustification. See
Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Industry and Energy, Case 72/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2727,
2752 (keeping essential services of the Member State running, although ensuring the
refinery's survival also meant thatjobs were safeguarded, which may very well have been
the real reason behind the measure in the first place, although the public security justi-
fication was advanced as the justification); The Queen v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, ex parte Evan Medical Ltd. et al. Case C-324/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-563,
608 (ensuring country has reliable supplies of essential medical purposes).
188. See, e.g., Firma Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v. Minister ftr Ernahrung, Case
251/78, [1979] E.C.R. 3369, 3392; Officier van Justitie v. Sandoz BV, Case 174/82,
[1983] E.C.R. 2445, 2464-65.
189. See Rewe Zentralfinanz eGmbH v. Landwirtschaftskammer, Case 4/75, [1975]
E.C.R. 843, 860.
190. See Commission v. Italy, Case 7/68, [1968] E.C.R. 423, 431; Bauhuis v. Nether-
lands, Case 46/76, [1977] E.C.R. 5, 15; Commission v. Ireland, Case 113/80, [1981]
E.C.R. 1625, 1638.
191. See, e.g., Criminal Proceedings Against Sandoz BV, Case 174/82, [1983]
E.C.R. 2445, 2463; Regina v. Henn & Darby, Case 34/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3795, 3815.
192. See O.C. Brandel, Die Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Missbrauchstabestande Bei Der
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Although the protection of fundamental rights does not feature
in Article 30 EC, it is now clear that the ECJ will have regard to
fundamental rights in interpreting that provision. 19 3
B. Article 30 EC
The heads of justification under Article 30 EC appear rela-
tively straightforward, although they have given rise to a veritable
wealth of case-law. Some of the most spectacular of these de-
serve mention here. Confirming continental views about the
strange preoccupations of the British, the cases clearly based on
the protection of public morality have come from the United
Kingdom: after the clear upholding of the right of the United
Kingdom to ban the importation of grossly obscene materials,194
the ECJ found, unsurprisingly, that the United Kingdom was not
entitled to ban the importation of blow-up dolls and sexy vac-
uum flasks when it did not prohibit their manufacture or sale
within its territory. 95 Sometimes public morality is bound up
with public policy, or expressed in wider public interest terms,
such as the protection of the interests of children. 96 Public pol-
icy, the second ground, is not simply an excuse for whatever suits
the government of the day, and it is not defined by national con-
cepts of the term; the limits on its use by the national authorities
are set by Community law, through the supervision by the ECJ,
although it may clearly vary from place to place and from time to
time.' 97 It was feared for a time that public security was in dan-
AusubungNationale Schutzrechte, GRUR INT'L 512 (1980); L.W. Gormley, supra note 15, at
217.
193. See, e.g., Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags-und vertriebs GmbH v.
Heinrich Bauer Verlag, Case C-368/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3689, 3717; Schmidberger v.
Austria, Case C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-5659, 5718.
194. See generally Regina v. Henn & Darby, Case 34/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3795.
195. See Conegate Ltd. v. H.M. Customs & Excise, Case 121/85, [1986] E.C.R.
1007; see generally L.W. Gormley, Cassis de Dijon and the Communication from the Commis-
sion, 6 EUR. L. REv. 454 (1981). '
196. See Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG, Case C-244/06, 1
36 (ECJ Feb. 14, 2008) (not yet reported). Sometimes public morality and public policy
are advanced in the context of a health justification, rather than separately. See The
Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Case C-1/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1251. In relation to the
freedom to provide services, see Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH
v. Oberbfrger-meisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-9609
and judgments cited there.
197. Thus it covers matters such as the protection of the integrity of coinage (see
Regina v. Thompson, Case 7/78, [1987] E.C.R. 2247) and reasonable measures to pre-
vent speculative transactions (see Commission v. Italy, Case 95/81, [1982] E.C.R. 2187)
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ger of providing a gaping hole through which national measures
could be pushed,'9 8 but it is now clear that the normal rules as to
justification really do apply in that area too and that the Member
States will not be allowed to get away with it.'99 The fifth
ground, the protection of national treasures possessing artistic,
historic, or archaeological value, has given rise to no case-law di-
rectly on point, although the heritage protection of works of art
has now been the subject of Community level measures; 2 0 this
may well indicate the development of a consciousness of the pat-
rimony of the Community as a whole (as opposed to merely local
patrimony), but in any event, the concept of artistic value resem-
bles a distinctly moveable feast.
2 1
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of case-law has concerned
the fourth ground, the protection of health and life of humans,
animals or plants, and the final ground, the protection of indus-
trial and commercial property. Taking these in turn, a number
of points on health protection deserve emphasis. Member States
and importers are obliged to cooperate: thus a Member State
must use in relation to a parallel import authorization proce-
dure for pharmaceuticals information which they already have in
their possession; 202 although, as noted above, the burden of
but the ECJ has refused to accept the argument that a measure is justified on public
policy grounds simply because it is reinforced by penal sanctions (see Criminal Pro-
ceedings Against Prantl, Case 16/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1299, 1329). The dangers of pro-
moting social unrest have not been accepted by the ECJ as a public policyjustification.
See Commission v. France, Case 52/95, [19951 E.C.R. 1-4443, 4468; Commission v.
France, Case C-265/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6959, 7003. The concept is well summarized (in
relation to persons, services, and capital) in Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-
GmbH v. Oberbfirgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-9609,
9651-52 and judgments cited there: public policy may only be relied upon if there is a
genuine and sufficiently serious (present) threat to a fundamental interest of society.
198. See, e.g., Campus Oil Ltd. v. The Minister for Industry and Energy, Case 72/
83, [1984] E.C.R. 2727; see also L.W. Gormley, supra note 15, 134-39. Public security
covers both internal and external security. See Criminal Proceeding Against Richardt,
Case C-367/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4621, 4652; Fritz- Werner Industrie-Ausrtistungen
GmbH v. Germany, Case C-70/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3189 at 3227; Criminal Proceedings
Against Leifer, Case C-83/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3231, 3249.
199. See generally Commission v. Greece, Case C-347/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-4747;
Criminal Proceedings Against Richardt, Case C-367/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4621.
200. See Council Directive No. 93/7, O.J. L 74/74 (1993), amended by O.J. L 60/59
(1997), amended by O.J. L 187/43 (2001).
201. See L.W. Gormley (1985), supra note 15, 184-89; P. Oliver (2003), supra note
92, 285-87.
202. See generally Officier vanjustitie v. De Peijper, Case 104/75, [1976] E.C.R. 613;
Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Bundesgesundheitsamt, Case C-207/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-3723
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proof that a measure is justified lies firmly on the party seeking
to justify it, importers must make available such information as
they have in their possession.2 °3 After initial problems, the case-
law on matters such as additives seems to have settled down, with
the ECJ being less inclined to accept thin arguments from Mem-
ber States.2" 4 It is also now clear that it will be difficult to justify
trying to prevent people taking advantage as individuals of the
single market throughout the EU.205 Health protection argu-
ments fall to be considered under Article 30 EC, not under
other justifications known to Community law.20 6
The case-law on the protection of industrial and commer-
cial property has developed apace since the early cases discussed
above; much now operates within the framework of Community
legislation, 20 7 but Oliver2 " has conveniently encapsulated much
in the following general rule and exceptions: Member States
(which, even though it dealt with a free trade agreement with what was at the time of
the facts a third country, Austria, saw the ECJ using the concept of the useful effect of
the agreement to apply the principle developed in De Peijper in that context as well).
203. See Criminal Proceedings Against Sandoz BV, Case 174/82, [1983] E.C.R.
2445, 2464-65.
204. The present state of the case-law is well illustrated by Commission v. Federal
Republic of Germany, Case 178/84, [1987] E.C.R. 1227; Commission v. Denmark, Case C-
192/01, [2003] E.C.R. 9693, and Commission v. France, Case C-24/00, [2004] E.C.R.
1277. That the precautionary principle is respected, however, is evident from cases such
as United Kingdom v. Commission, Case 180/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2265, 2298 (in relation to
the Community's right to take protective measures during the BSE crisis). Increasingly,
Community harmonization measures occupy the field, thus limiting the room for Mem-
ber States' individual requirements; in the presence of total occupation of the field at
Community level, the justification for unilateral national measures disappears; in the
case of partial harmonization, the Member States must not only comply with, as appro-
priate, Community law on the free movement of goods, they must also, by virtue of Art.
10 EC, not endanger the proper functioning of the rules which have been harmonized
at Community level. See, e.g., Criminal Proceedings Against Van Bennekom, Case 227/
82, [1983] E.C.R. 3883, 3904; National Farmers' Union v. Secrftariat G~n~ral du
Gouvernement, Case C-241/01, [20021 E.C.R. 1-9079, 9126 (citing various earlier judg-
ments); see also HLH Warenvertriebs GmbH v. Germany, Cases C-211/03, [2005] E.C.R.
5141, 5221-23.
205. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt-am-Main-Ost, Case 215/87,
[1989] E.C.R. 617; Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employ~s Priv~s, Case C-120/95,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-1831.
206. See, e.g., Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA v. Departamento de Sanidad y
Seguridad Social de la Generaliteit de Catalufia, Cases C-1 & 176/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-
4151, 4183-84 (overruling the inclusion of public health in the list of "mandatory re-
quirements" in Cassis de Dion).
207. See, e.g., Council Directive No. 89/304, O.J. L 30/1 (1989), amended by O.J. L
6/35 (1992).
208. P. Oliver (2003), supra note 92, at 332.
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may legislate in the intellectual property field, unless it is the
subject of Community harmonized legislation provided that they
do not discriminate on ground of nationality or place of manu-
facture,2 °9 that they do not interrupt goods in transit unless the
intellectual property rights were being used within their terri-
tory,21° and, finally, that they must not allow the owner of a right
to prevent the importation or sale of goods which have been law-
fully obstructed on the market of another Member State by the
owner of that right or with his consent.2
1
In regards to the second sentence of Article 30 EC, in addi-
tion to the general remarks as to its function made above, it is
worth recalling that the number of occasions on which the ECJ
has clearly used the second sentence of Article 30 EC to strike
down national attempts to justify barriers to trade is actually
small, although the cases have been spectacular.212 The result is
that there is no hiding place for arguments that are merely spe-
cious or disingenuous.
C. Case-Law-Based Justifications
The basic principle in Dassonville was however also accompa-
nied by a recognition that, pending action at the Community
level to afford guarantees of certain interests or values, national
measures taken in order to secure those guarantees or values
would be acceptable subject to certain conditions. Thus, the ECJ
admitted what is sometimes-and it is submitted with hindsight,
perhaps rather misleadingly-called a rule of reason 13 (later
209. See, e.g., Phil Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Cases C-92 & 326/92,
[1993] E.C.R. 1-5145; Commission v. Italy, Case C-235/89, [1992] E.C.R. 1-777; Commis-
sion v. United Kingdom, Case C-30/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-829.
210. See, e.g., Commission v. France, Case 23/99, [2000] E.C.R. 1-7653.
211. This idea was launched in Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v.
Metro-SB-Grodmirkte GmbH & Co. KG, Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R. 487, as was noted
above, see generally, P. Oliver (1993), supra note 92, 343-358; see also supra notes 26-27
and accompanying text. As to repackaging, see Eurim-Pharm Arzneimittel GmbH v.
Beiersdorf AG, Cases C-71-73/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3063. This approach has been taken
into Community legislation in the field (see, e.g. First Trademark Directive, Council
Directive No. 89/104, O.J. L 40/1 (1989); Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S,Joined
Cases C-427, 429, 436/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3457.
212. See generally Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 40/82, [1982] E.C.R. 2793;
Commission v. France, Case 42/82, [1983] E.C.R. 1013.
213. See generally L.W. Gormley, The Genesis of the Rule of Reason in the Free Movement
of Goods, in RULE OF REASON-RETHINKING ANOTHER CLAssic OF EUROPEAN LEGAL Doc-
TRINE 21, 21-33 (A. Schrauwen ed. 2005).
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designated mandatory requirements) 21 4 which tempered, albeit
only on a provisional basis pending action at the Community
level to cover them, the rigors of the principle of the free move-
ment of goods.215 This is despite the repeated insistence that the
heads of justification of Article 30 EC cannot be expanded.21 6
There has been much debate as to whether these case-law based
interests are taken into account when assessing the applicability
of Article 28 EC, or whether they should be regarded as in fact
an extension of Article 30 EC.2 17 It is respectfully submitted that
neither view is correct. 2 18 It is often thought that the case-law-
based justifications began in Cassis de Dijon, but this is incorrect,
as the first heads of justification surfaced in Dassonville itself.
2 19
Cassis de Dijon is indeed of importance for the further elabora-
tion of these heads, 220 although it is actually far more important
for launching the significance of the mutual recognition con-
cept in the free movement of goods. It is sometimes argued that
the ECJ has no power simply to create new exceptions to the
basic principles of the EC Treaty,22 ' but this misunderstands the
essentially equitable nature of the ECJ's approach.222 Measures
justified on the case-law-based exceptions do constitute measures
caught by Article 28 EC, but are acceptable because of their pur-
214. See Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, 662.
215. The provisional basis of the case-law based justifications is evident from the
formulation in Dassonville, "in the absence of a Community system guaranteeing for
consumers the authenticity of a product's designation of origin." Procureur du Roi v.
Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852.
216. See supra note 189.
217. In favour of the first of these approaches, V. Hatzopoulos, Exigences Essentieles,
Imperatives ou Imperieuses Una Theorie, des Theories ou Pas de Theorie du Tout, RTDE 191
(1998); A. MATrERA, LE MARCHE UNIQUE EUROPEN-SES REGLES, SON FONCTIONNEMENT
274 (2d. ed., 1990). See, e.g., in favor of the second, C. Barnard, Barnard, Fitting the
Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jigsaw, 26 EUR. L. REV. 35, 54 (2001); J.C.
Masclet, Les Articles 30, 36 et 100 du Traiti CEE a la Lumiere de l'Arret "Cassis de Dijon,"
RTDE 611, 611-634 (1980); W.H. ROTH, WIRTSCHAFr IN RECHT UND PRAxis 979 (2000);
Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the
Evolution of the Free Movement of Goods, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 349, 366 (Paul
Craig & Grdiinne de B(Irca eds., 1999).
218. The case-law-based exceptions do not determine substantively what is or is not
caught by Art. 28 EC, nor are they an extension of Art. 30 EC.
219. See Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852, 6.
220. Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, 662.
221. See, e.g., R. Barents, New Developments in Measures Having Equivalent Effects, 18
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 271, 285 (1981); C. Masclet, Les Articles 30, 36 Et 100 du Traite
CEE d la Lumiere de l'Arret "Cassis de Dijon", RTDE 611, 625 (1980).
222. See L.W. Gormley, supra note 15, at 56.
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pose and extent.223 The case-law-based exceptions reflect the la-
cunae in protection that still exist in the present state of integra-
tion in the Community, and recognize the need, pending action
at the Community level, to allow Member States to act to ensure
that the interests or values concerned guarantee the general in-
terest. Such measures must be applicable to domestic and im-
ported products alike and must be necessary and proportionate
to the interest or value concerned, and moreover, the second
sentence of Article 30 EC applies by analogy.224 Despite the ab-
erration in relation to environmental protection,225 it is submit-
ted that the proposition that the case-law-based exceptions are
only available for measures which are equally applicable irre-
spective of the origin of the goods (domestic or coming from
other Member States) represents good law. 2 26 The class of case-
law based interests or values which may justify barriers to intra-
Community trade is not closed, but the following heads ofjustifi-
cation are clearly permissible, subject to compliance with the re-
quirements of necessity, proportionality, and the second sen-
tence of Article 30 EC: consumer protection,2 27 the prevention
of unfair commercial transactions,228 the effectiveness of fiscal
supervision, 229 environmental protection,230 the improvement of
223. See Commission v. Germany, Case C-463/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-11705, 11759.
224. See Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852, 6.
225. See generally Commission v. Belgium, Case 2/90, [19921 E.C.R. 14431.
226. See Commission v. Ireland, Case 113/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1625, 1639; R. Ba-
rents, New Developments in Measures Having Equivalent Effect, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
271, 291 (1981); L.W. Gormley, supra note 15, at 57; see also L.W. GORMLEY, RULE OF
REASON-RETHINKING ANOTHER CLASSIC OF EUROPEAN LEGAL DOCTRINE 21, 30-32 (A.
Schrauwen ed. 2005) (the author agrees with P. Oliver (2003), supra note 92, 211 when
he says that the ECJ has had recourse to some far-fetched-not to say-exotic devices to
maintain this facade, although the author does not regard the distinction between Art.
30 EC exceptions and the case-law-based exceptions as a facade). The ECJ will look
behind the face of ostensibly equally applicable measures, however, to see if they in
reality disadvantage imports; in such circumstances, the justification will fail, see e.g.,
Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 207/85, [1985] E.C.R. 1201.
227. See, e.g., Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852;
Cassis de Dijon, [1979] E.C.R. 649, 662; Commission v. France, Case 216/84, [1988]
E.C.R. 793, 812-13.
228. See, e.g., Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852;
Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78 [1979] E.C.R. 649, 662; Commission v. France, Case 216/
84, [1988] E.C.R. 793, 812-13.
229. See, e.g., Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78 [1979] E.C.R. 649, 662.
230. See, e.g., Commission v. Denmark, Case 302/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4607; Commis-
sion v Belgium, Case 2/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-4431. The conclusions in Aher-Wagon v.
Germany, Case C-389/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4473 and PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG,
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working conditions,231 and the plurality of the media.232 To
these, and this is in common with the justifications mentioned in
the first sentence of Article 30 EC, must be added the overall
importance of fundamental rights (whether in general or in
terms of human dignity) .231 In view of the ECJ's case-law on Arti-
cle 29 EC, discussed above, it would appear that there is no room
for case-law based exceptions in relation to that provision.23 4
The finding that a measure is justified does not mean that
such a measure ceases to be a measure having equivalent effect.
The case-law based exceptions are clearly distinguishable from
obstacles to trade which are deemed not to fall within the defini-
tion of measures having equivalent effect under the Keck ap-
proach.23 5 There is, it is submitted, still a clear distinction be-
tween the EC Treaty-based justifications and those finding their
basis solely in case-law under the "mandatory requirements"; to
assimilate them 2 6 is, with the utmost possible respect, a funda-
mentally flawed approach.
VII. FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN LIGHT OF THE OTHER
FREEDOMS OF THE TREATY
The question of the convergence or divergence of the fun-
damental freedoms of the treaty in the internal market has been
Case C-379/98, [2001] E.C.R. 1-2099 are also remarkable, to say the least. Perhaps the
honest answer, with as much respect as can be mustered, is that the ECJ is so scared of
environmental arguments that it is prepared to stand logical analysis on its head!
231. See, e.g., Summary Proceedings Against Oebel, Case 155/80, [1981] E.C.R.
1993; Union D~partementale des Syndicates CGT de I'Aisne v. SIDEF Conforama, Case
C-312/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-997; Criminal Proceedings Against Marchandise, Case C-332/
89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1027; Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent v. B & Q PLC, Case C-
169/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6635; Rochdale Borough Council v. Anders, Case C-306/88,
[1992] E.C.R. 1-6457; Reading Borough Council v. Payless D1Y Ltd., Case C-304/90,
[1992] E.C.R. 1-6493.
232. See Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags-und vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich
Bauer Verlag, Case C-368/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3689.
233. See id. at 3717; Schmidberger v. Austria, Case C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-5659,
5718; Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG, Case C-244/06 (ECJ Feb.
14, 2008) (not yet reported).
234. This follows from the ECJ's approach in P B Groenveld BV v. Produktschap
voor ee en Vlees, Case 15/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3409.
235. See Criminal Proceedings Against Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 &
268/91 [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, 6131.
236. See P. Oliver, supra note 92, at 216; Oliver, supra note 108, at 804 (he acknowl-
edges that his view is not shared by the majority of writers); see also Gormley, supra note
213, at 25.
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the subject of considerable discussion, 23 7 so that the present ob-
servations may be brief. On the one hand, a certain conver-
gence can be seen in the development of case-law based justifica-
tions in relation to other freedoms;2 8 but on the other hand,
the ECJ has rejected calls to apply Keck outside the area of the
free movement of goods,239 or to introduce a nationality-based
beneficiary criterion into Article 28 EC 240 and thus to promote a
unified approach to the freedoms. The changed emphasis in
the free movement of workers, the freedom of establishment,
and the freedom to provide services away from merely discrimi-
nation-based concepts to become more potentially and even (in-
directly) effect-oriented 24' demonstrate that the ECJ is willing to
look to maintain the integrationist effects of intra-Community
237. See generally P. Behrens, Die Konvergenz der wirtschaftlichen Freiheiten im Europais-
chen Gemeinschaftsrecht, 27 EUROPARECHT 145 (1992); J. SNELL, GOODS AND SERVICES IN
EC LAw (2002); SERVICES AND FREE MOVEMENT IN EU LAW (M. Andenas & W.H. Roth
eds., 2002), which contains a large number of valuable essays.
238. See, e.g., the conditions set out in Kraus v. Land Baden-Wirttemberg, Case
19/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1663; Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financien, Case C-
384/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1141; Konsumentenombudsman v. De Agostini (Svenska)
F6rlag AB, Cases C-34-36/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3843 (public interest requirements; these
too will be available only to equally applicable measures-save perhaps for environmen-
tal protection, although this is not clear); in any case, measures which discriminate will
have to be justified on the basis of the EC Treaty itself (or a (temporary) derogation
under an Act of Accession); see Ciola v. Land Vorarlberg, Case C-224/97, [1999] E.C.R.
1-2517, 2536; P. Oliver & S. Enchelmaier, Free Movement of Goods, 44 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 649, 670 (2007) (regarding the principles governing justification of restrictions
falling under Articles 28 and 49 EC as essentially the same). That is certainly true as
regard the assessment of proportionality, and it seems that it ought to be true as regards
case-law based justifications (public interest justifications). But only so far: Arts. 39(3)
and 46 EC mention only public policy, public security, and public health (respectively
for free movement of workers and freedom of establishment and, by virtue of Art. 55 (1)
EC, also freedom to provide services); Art. 58(1)(b) (capital and payments) mentions
public policy and public security, but also infringements of tax law, the need for compli-
ance with prudential supervision requirements, and statistical declaration information;
these cover some of the case-law-based justifications in relation to the free movement of
goods, but not all of them, nor do they embrace the whole scope of Art. 30 EC. Art.
58(3) EC parallels the requirements of the second sentence of Art. 30 EC.
239. See, e.g., Alpine Investments BV v. Minister Van Financi4n, Case C-384/93,
[1995] E.C.R. 1-1141, 1177-78; Union Royale Belge des Sociftes de Football Association
ASBL v. Bosman, Case C-415/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4921, 5070-71; see also G. Tesauro,
supra note 119, at 7.
240. See the rejection of the argument of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in
Alfa Vita VassilopoulosAEv. EllinikoDimosio, Cases C-158 & 159/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-8135.
241. See, e.g., Union Royale Beige des Socit6s de Football Association v. Bosman,
Case C-415/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4921, 5068-71. This tendency has become even greater
since the introduction of Union Citizenship, see, e.g., Grzelczyk v. Centre Public D'aide
Sociale Ottignies-Louvain-La-Nueve, Case C-184/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6193.
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market penetration, although the nuancing of earlier case-law in
Keck can be seen as a warning against abuse. In practice, the
ECJ's refusal to allow Keck to become a general escape clause has
greatly mitigated the damage which was feared and even done
when the judgment in Keck was handed down.
A few more specific comments on convergence may be use-
ful. Certainly the internal market has come alive and offers its
beneficiaries a single market place within which to engage in lei-
sure, business, or other pursuits. But there are differences in
how the freedoms of the internal market operate. First, certain
freedoms are clearly nationality-based,242 whereas the free move-
ment of goods is not limited on ground of nationality, and some-
times freedoms are specifically extended to benefit third-country
nationals.243 Secondly, the coming of age of the freedom to pro-
vide services, both in economic terms and in terms of motoring
economic interpenetration within the single market, might be
taken to indicate that the free movement of goods is now less
important, but it is respectfully submitted that that belief is
somewhat premature. Thirdly, while it is true that the Constitu-
tion would have moved the place of goods in the definition of
the internal market 24 4 that has not happened in the amend-
ments which the Treaty of Lisbon would bring into force, as a
result of which the present definition of Article 14(2) EC will
seamlessly transform into Article 26(2) FEU, with no change in
the order of the freedoms.
If the ECJ had not decided Keck as it did, but had applied its
earlier case-law and found that the French rule could be justified
on consumer protection grounds, a more unified approach to
the freedoms would have been much more possible (subject to
the nationality points). It is therefore submitted that while there
242. Such as the free movement of (legal and natural) persons.
243. The benefit of free movement of persons is extended to, e.g., European Eco-
nomic Area and Swiss nationals by specific enlargement of the scope of the secondary
legislation concerned; the benefit of the free movement of capital extends to third
countries, with very limited exceptions, by virtue of Art. 56 EC. See, further, Fidium
Finanz AG v. BundesanstaltfiirFinanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Case C-452/04, [2006] E.C.R.
1-9521: a Swiss company was not permitted to grant unauthorized loans in Germany, as
the provisions of the freedom to provide services (including the EC Treaty and public
interest justifications) took precedence over the provisions of the EC Treaty on capital
and payments (Arts. 56-60 EC).
244. See Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Art. 111-130(2), O.J. C
310/1, at 58 (2004). That Constitution was not ratified by all Member States and has
now been superseded by the Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 3.
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are indications of some osmosis, and the freedoms have in com-
mon that they all contribute to the integration inherent in the
single market and act as motors of integration, they will not
through case-law alone develop into a coherent whole.
CONCLUSION
Of the issues discussed in this birthday present, what to do
with Keck is probably potentially most ripe for development, par-
ticularly in view of the divergence in views expressed by various
Advocates General noted above. But other issues need attention,
such as revisiting Article 29 EC. The ECJ really has not reacted
to pressure from some learned writers and Advocates General to
develop a new general theory of the free movement of goods, or
a unified theory for the four freedoms.245 The present writer has
serious doubts about whether such a development would be at
all helpful: one-size-fits-all legal solutions tend not to work out in
practice, and are often inelegant in conception and even worse
in implementation. Hence, this contribution has resisted all
temptations to advance some revolutionary approach. Instead,
the submission really is that the ECJ should seriously consider
renouncing Keck, and all its works, and all its pomps. 24 6 The last
thing that it should do is extend the range of measures which it
deems to fall outside the basic principle in Dassonville (albeit
subject to conditions); thus the siren call of Advocate General
Kokott discussed above should not be heeded. This is emphati-
cally not to plead for a mechanical application of the basic prin-
ciple in Dassonville in an unrestrained manner, rather it is to ar-
gue that the ECJ should not shy away from making assess-
ments-always remaining within the limits of its jurisdiction-
but guiding the national courts towards pragmatic and common-
sense solutions. The astute use of the basic principle, combined
with a sensible application of the case-law-based justifications as
well as those envisaged by the EC Treaty does not have to lead to
the ECJ being overworked or unmeritorious litigants being re-
warded. It should lead to a harmonious application of the law,
245. See, e.g., the various writings and Opinions as Advocate General, of Poiares
Maduro. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
246. These might be suitable baptismal vows for assessing the suitability of future
members of the ECJ!
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rather than its obfuscation by knee-jerk reactions to discourage
litigants whom the ECJ has encouraged in the first place.
Birthdays, and other anniversaries are a time for reflection
and also for looking forward. This plea for returning to the roots
and letting Dassonville work without artificial constraints, 24 7 is
perhaps a reflection of part of the song referred to in the title:
Love is always young and fair,
What to us is silver hair?248
50 years on, it may truly be said of the free movement of goods
that it has somewhat matured, but has not yet settled down. Even
if, as was noted at the outset of this article, for the EC Treaty it
looks as if "life is fading fast away, ' ' 24 9 nobody should doubt that
the free movement of goods within the European Union-just
like the Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution-will in 50
years time still be as stimulating and probably as controversial a
subject for discussion and development of the law as it has been
in the last 50 years. Very many happy returns to what for the
author is still a most lively and rewarding experience:
Since I kissed you mine alone, you have never older grown.250
247. Such as saying that a measure which it is admitted may hinder trade between
Member States does not amount to a prohibited measure within the Dassonville defini-
tion (as in Keck).
248. EBEN E. REXFORD, H.P. DANKS, SILVER THREADS AMONG THE GOLD (1872).
249. See id.
250. See id.
2008] 1691
